

POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA
10/1/68

STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW
☐ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to _____
☒ Declassify with no restriction
EO 12958, 25X
FPC/HDR by BD Date: 3/19/96
Withdrawal No: _____

0910

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 959503
By MW NARA Date 10/5/05

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TOUNCLASSIFIED
Classification

264670

31 Oct 68 20 57Z

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS

Info: Amembassy LONDON
PARIS
US MISSION GENEVA
USUN
CINCSRIKE
Amconsul IBADAN
KADUNA

LONDON FOR PALMER

SUBJECT: Nigeria Press Summary - October 31

1. No summary for Oct 30.
2. NYTimes carries Ben Welles piece headed Biafran-aid pleas mounting in US, Optimistic Relief Report is Disputed - Mail Building Up. Candles borne silently by about 200 marchers near Lincoln Memorial Friday night in nationwide series vigils reflected rising concern American people, especially students, over plight Nigeria's starving war victims. Dr. Herman Middlekoop, Dutch relief worker for WCC in Biafra, recently forecast 25,000 deaths daily in Biafra in December unless cease-fire. To surprise officials and relief experts here, Samuel A. Gonard, president of ICRC, private Swiss-based group, said at Geneva news conference this week famine crisis has now been QTE more or less overcome UNQTE. Reporting a QTE clear improvement UNQTE ~~new~~ in food situation for victims both sides of fighting lines, Gonard noted ICRC now feeding 750,000 victims daily in what

Drafted by: AF/P:RLPerkins mb 10/31/68

Tel. Ext. 2105

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by

Nigerian Task Force: RPSmith

Clearances:

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

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By: MNARA Date: 10/5/03

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
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left of Biafra plus 500,000 in areas retaken by feds. Most Rev. Edward E. Swanstrom, head Catholic Relief Services emergency aid effort for Biafra and unofficial coordinator US interreligious aid, termed Gonard statement QTE highly misleading UNQTE. Other govt and volag officials here and in NY also warned problem starvation in Nigeria growing, not diminishing. So is Americans' desire alleviate problem. White House, State Dept, Congressional and relief sources report deluge of mail, telegrams and phone calls from across country. These inquiries said reflect increasing disquiet over Administration's apparent inability or unwillingness slash through red tape and feed war victims. Aides of Senator Ted Kennedy reported receiving at least 20,000 messages after his public criticisms Sept 23 and Oct 4 of government QTE timidity UNQTE and his demands more be done regardless diplomatic niceties. QTE There already at least ten volunteer groups across country asking how they can help Nigerian war victims UNQTE said Paul Connett, chairman American Committee Keep Biafra Alive at 2440 Broadway at 90th Street, Manhattan. Connett, young Englishman who helped found committee last July with several Peace Corps vols returned from Nigeria, stressed that org not supporting Biafra politically but charitably. QTE The name's a bit of a misnomer UNQTE he conceded in telephone interview. QTE We're purely humanitarian. We're out to stimulate US public support for sick and starving both sides of Fighting. Why, for instance, can't govt take some of C-130s and C-119s out of Vietnam and send them to Biafra? UNQTE. To growing number Americans, diplomatic and logistic complications seem less

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important than what they deem be US traditional moral leadership in world affairs and its record humanitarian concern. Such views while understood, and sometimes even shared, by policy-making officials run aground on shoals US foreign policy. In brief, according virtually all informed officials here, USG cannot directly assist Biafra except with permission govt in Lagos headed by Col. Gowon. Because US recognizes Lagos govt as only legitimate one in Nigeria and because Lagos govt regards Biafra as rebellious province, US, the policy line runs, has only limited options. QTE there is one agency alone acceptable to both Nigeria and Biafra - the ICRC. We must channel all govt help through ICRC. We can give food to voluntary church agencies helping Biafra, but US AID technicians must go via ICRC to be used as federal authorities agree UNQTE said one senior official. For this reason, informants here said, Johnson Administration has within last week refused plea of coordinated Protestant Catholic Jewish group in NY for loan of one or two C-130 Hercules military cargo planes with military crews in civilian clothes.

3. Comment: Department mail on Biafra appears have peaked latter part of August. Last five weekly figures on letter mail, from week ending Oct 29 backwards: 164, 131, 161, 274, 232. For same period total petition signatures and clipout campaign mail: 700, 5,000, 5,630, 2,225, 529. These figures would include much mail forwarded from White House.

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By: MVA/NARA Date: 10/5/03

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4. UPI Paris ticker reports morning Oct 31 Biafra receiving enough arms and ammunition through Gabon to sustain Nigerian rebels for several months, a French mercenary just returned from Biafra told UPI. Mercenary, former French officer who fought in Congo on both sides, said Biafra receiving average 21 tons war supplies daily by air from Libreville. Airfield being used about 30 miles north of Umuahia, last large town left in shrinking Ibo heartland and headquarters Biafran govt. QTE from a peak of 580 mercenaries a few months ago, there are only 250 left. Some 200 were killed or injured and others returned to Europe UNQTE he said.

5. Christian Science Monitor Oct 31 has editorial headed Nigeria's Torment. It good that ICRC now able report QTE clear improvement UNQTE in getting food to starving victims Nigerian war. We salute efforts men at top of Red Cross and bravery handful dedicated men and women working for org under trying and often dangerous circumstances on spot. But if this means fewer women and children succumbing in Nigerian countryside and refugee camps, it still does not mean scourge fratricidal killing lifted from land. Toward end of summer, it looked as if FMG forces were about launch thrust which would bring military operations to end. Not that this was in itself cause unmitigated comfort; it was likely cause more suffering still, but at least - with failure two sides to parley - it offered prospect end military campaign. Today however Ibos, who 18 months ago proclaimed independent state Biafra, still holding out in their heartland. Yet another fed offensive apparently stalled. For this,

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of course, Ibo determination fight to end rather than submit federal forces largely responsible. But there persistent reports another factor has contributed frustration FMG's hope end of fighting before end of year. This is reported channeling to Biafra in recent weeks of arms either from France, or ~~xxxxxxx~~ bought with French money, or delivered to Biafran airstrips with French help. These supplies funneled into Biafra through airports at Abidjan in Ivory Coast and Libreville in Gabon - both territories where France maintains a presence. President de Gaulle, while not yet recognizing Biafra, has put on record his sympathy for Biafran cause. More strident of French President's critics suspect he might see in Biafra an African Quebec. Paren He did in fact link the two at Sept 9 news conference close paren. These critics wonder whether the General might not feel tempted use Biafra, as he has been using Quebec, to disrupt a federal entity which - if it developed healthily and without impediment - might strengthen paren as he sees it close paren the English-speaking or Anglo-Saxon oriented world. If such reports and assessments accurate, they mean darkening of clouds that offsets better news about famine relief. Stepping up arms race and outside-power involvement in Nigeria are equally deplorable.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, AID 28, RSR 01, 145 W
078524

R 311122Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3330
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA
CINCSRIKE/CINCMEMSA
DIA

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS 14058

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN REACTION TO FRENCH AID TO REBELS

1. CONSUL KADUNA HAS INFORMED US THAT LT COL ADAMU, COMMANDER FIRST DIVISION (REAR), TOOK UNUSUAL STEP OF VISITING HIM TO EXPRESS CONCERN AT FRENCH MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO REBELS. ADAMU MENTIONED INCREASE IN REBEL FIREPOWER AND ASKED IF AMERICANS HAD ANY GTE INTELLIGENCE UNQTE ON MATTER.

2. EMBASSY AUTHORIZED KADUNA TO REPLY TO ADAMU IN BROAD GENERAL TERMS, DRAWING PRIMARILY UPON WHAT WORLD PRESS IS REPORTING. HE APPEARED MORE THAN SATISFIED.

3. COMMENT: ADAMU'S CONCERN IS SYMPTOMATIC OF WORRIES WHICH INCREASINGLY EVIDENT IN PAST FEW WEEKS. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE IS ANY REAL FEAR THAT THE REBELS CAN TURN THE TIDE, BUT THERE IS A DEFINITE CONCERN THAT THE WAR IS BEING PROLONGED BY FRENCH AID AND ENCOURAGEMENT TO REBELS. THERE IS ALSO A FEELING OF FRUSTRATION DERIVING FROM REALIZATION THAT THERE IS LITTLE FMG CAN DO ABOUT FRENCH ACTIVITY AND THAT OVERREACTION COULD EVEN PROVOKE FRENCH INTO STEPPING UP THEIR AID.

GP-3. MATHEWS

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, RSR 01, AID 28, SCA 02,
SCS 04, SAH 02, FBI 01, MC 01, ACDA 16, E 15, DOT 12, NIC 01, SY 03,
/202. W

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10-30-68

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R 301400Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3306
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA

UNCLAS LAGOS 14020

SUBJECT: BIAFRAN ATTACK ON HANK WARTON

1. FBIS ITEM N291025 OCT 29 GIVES TEXT OF LONG BIAFRAN
RADIO BROADCAST WHICH CITES BRITISH MAGAZINE QTE PRIVATE
EYE UNQTE REPORT THAT BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
IN AUGUST QTE BOUGHT OVER HANK WARTON, AN AMERICAN
WHO HITHERTO HAD MADE MILLIONS OF POUNDS FROM BIAFRA
THROUGH HIS MONOPOLY OF AIRLIFTING GOODS INTO
BIAFRA. UNQTE THEN, QUOTING STATEMENT RELEASED BY
BIAFRAN MININFO EKE, BROADCAST SAYS THAT WARTON REFUSAL ON
VARIOUS PRETEXTS, TO FLY IN ARMS AND AMMUNITION,

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NECESSITATED REORGANIZATION OF BIAFRAS AIRLINKS TO FIND NEW SOURCES, PILOTS, AIRCRAFT AND SPARE PARTS. BECAUSE OF THIS REORGANIZATION, BIAFRA RECEIVED NO NEW ARMS OR AMMUNITION FOR THREE-WEEK PERIOD IN LATE AUGUST AND EARLY SEPTEMBER. EKE ATTRIBUTES FMG CAPTURE OF ABA, OWERRI AND OKIGWI TO THIS HIATUS IN ARMS SUPPLIES. EKE ALSO SAID THAT WHEN COS QTE PLOT UNQTE FAILED AND BIAFRANS ARRANGED NEW AIRLIFT, HMG DECIDED TO QTE BLAME FRANCE FOR ALLEGED ARMS BUILD-UP USING GULLIBLE CHEAP TRICK JOURNALISM. UNQTE ALSO REITERATES CHARGE THAT QTE BIAFRA-NIGERIA WAR IS IMPERIALIST WAR INSPIRED BY COLONIALIST BRITAINS HAROLD WILSON SUPPORTED BY DECADENT JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION OF US AND REVISIONIST SOVIET UNION. UNQTE


2. OCTOBER 30 BENIN CITY (OBSERVER) FRONT PAGES STORY THAT WARTON NOW IN MADRID AND THAT HE AND QTE HIS BIAFRAN FRIENDS UNQTE HAVE BROKEN UP. QUOTES MIAMI QTE SPOKESMAN QTE OF WARTON AS STATING THAT BIAFRAN CHARGES THAT WARTON DOUBLE-CROSSED THEM ARE QTE JAZZ UNQTE AND STATES BIAFRANS OWE WARTON GREAT DEAL OF MONEY WHICH THEY HAVE REFUSED TO PAY. ALSO STATES WARTON LOST FOUR SUPER CONSTELLATIONS DURING AIRLIFT.

3. OCT 30 (FBIS N301000) RADIO BIAFRA AGAIN ATTACKED WARTON, CHARGING THAT WARTON AGENTS PLANTED PLASTIC BOMBS IN LISBON AIRPORT ON FOUR OCCASIONS IN EARLY OCTOBER IN ATTEMPT TO SABOTAGE NEW AIRLIFT TO BIAFRA. STATES THAT QTE WARTON NOW IMPORTANT PERSON WITH AMERICAN EMBASSY IN LISBON. TRUTH IS THAT HE HAD ALSO BECOME CIA AGENT. UNQTE BROADCAST ALSO CHARGES THAT QTE COMMONWEALTH-CIA-LAGOS UNQTE HAVE PAID WARTON QTE NOT LESS THAN MILLION POUNDS UNQTE FOR BETRAYING BIAFRANS.

MATHEWS

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ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, NSA 02, IO 13, AID 28, ACDA 16, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07,

L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04,

SCA 02, RSR 01, 171 W

073408

R 301615Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3317
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA
DIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L LAGOS 14036

SUBJ: TRIBULATIONS OF MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP

REF: STATE 263444

1. EMBASSY HAS LEARNED FURTHER DETAILS OF ADEKUNLE'S DRESSING DOWN OF OBSERVERS IN PORT HARCOURT LAST WEEKEND, WHICH CULMINATED IN OFFER FLOG SWEDISH MEMBER OF TEAM AFTER TEAM DECLINED CHANGE ITINERARY HIS AREA.

2. ACCORDING BBC CORRESPONDENT MCDERMID, WHO PRESENT DURING ENTIRE SCENE, ADEKUNLE TREATED TEAM, AND SWEDISH MEMBER RAAB IN PARTICULAR, WITH CALCULATED SCORN, CONTEMPT AND RIDICULE, E.G., SNEERING AT SWEDES AS DECADENT NATION WHOSE SOLDIERS UNTRIED IN BATTLE WHICH MADE RAAB UNFIT OBSERVE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR.

3. MCDERMID HAD STRONG IMPRESSION, WHICH LARGELY CONFIRMED BY OTHER REPORTS WE HAVE HAD, THAT ADEKUNLE ADMINISTERED THIS TONGUE-LASHING DELIBERATELY; THAT HE WAS IN CONTROL OF HIMSELF THROUGHOUT; AND THAT HIS REMARKS WERE PROBABLY INTENDED FOR DOMESTIC NIGERIAN CONSUMPTION WITHOUT

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REGARD TO WHAT SUCH PERFORMANCE MIGHT DO TO FMG IMAGE ABROAD.

4. COMMENT: WE NOTE FROM REFTEL THAT INCIDENT HAS BEEN RECORDED IN US PRESS, AND BELIEVE FMG LUCKY THAT IT HAS NOT RECEIVED MORE NOTICE. ON SUBSTANTIVE SIDE, IT POSSIBLE THIS ANTIC BEHAVIOR COULD EASILY SOUR OBSERVERS, EXPERIENCED SOLDIERS WHO HAVE GIVEN FMG GOOD REPORTS SO FAR, BUT PROBABLY NOT INCLINED FORGET QUICKLY SUCH PROVOCATIVE ACTION. ADEKUNLE IS ERRATIC, BUT IN HIS CRITICISM OF OBSERVER GROUP HE ECHOING SAME SUSPICIONS WHICH MANY NIGERIANS INCREASINGLY DISPLAY IN THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD OTHER OUTSIDE GROUPS (E.G. ICRC) WHICH IMPINGE UPON FMG WAR EFFORT. BRITISH HAVE REPORT THAT MORNING AFTER ADEKUNLE QTE AGAIN FRIENDLY AND COOPERATIVE UNQTE SO IT POSSIBLE ISSUE MAY NOT ARISE AGAIN. GP-3.
MATHEWS

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ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, ACDA 16, SA 01, SAH 02, AID 28, PC 04, SR 01, ORM 03,

SCS 04, SCA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, RSR 01, 176 W
074103

P R 301545Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3316
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
USSMISSION GENEVA 682

UNCLAS LAGOS 14033

SUBJECT: SECOND INTERIM REPORT BY UNSYG REPRESENTATIVE

REF: LAGOS (A) 13297 ; (B) 13833 ; (C) A-899

1. GUSSING RELEASING SECOND INTERIM REPORT AT 1600 GMT TODAY (HIS FIRST WAS NOT SO HANDLED BUT SENT TO UNSYG FOR SUCH USE AS SYG WISHED TO MAKE OF IT).

2. REPORT DOES NOT VARY IN ESSENTIALS FROM THIRD INTERIM REPORT OF OBSERVER TEAM (REFS (B) AND (C)). IT DOES NOT USE THE WORD GENOCIDE BUT DOES SAY, QTE THERE WERE NO CONFIRMED REPORTS OF WANTON DESTRUCTION OF CIVILIAN LIFE, MALTREATMENT OR CRUELTY TO CIVILIANS. UNQTE

3. REPORT GOES INTO GREATER DETAIL THAN TEAM REPORT ON RELIEF ACTIVITIES. GUSSING NOTES, QTE RELIEF ACTIVITY AS A WHOLE WAS IMPRESSIVE, BUT PRESENT STAFF AND RESOURCES ONLY JUST ADEQUATE FOR CURRENT SITUATION. UNQTE HE PRAISES COOPERATION BETWEEN ARMY AND RELIEF AGENCIES BUT NOTES IT QTE CLEARLY DESIRABLE UNQTE THAT ARMY SHOULD SOON BE RELIEVED OF RESPONSIBILITY.

4. IN SUM, REPORT GIVES FMG GOOD MARKS WITHOUT WHITEWASHING.

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5. FULL TEXT WILL FOLLOW BY AIRGRAM.

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INFO: EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, NSA 02, AID 28, ACDA 16, SAH 02, SA 01,
RSR 01, SR 01, 165 W

073654

R 301615Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3318
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L LAGOS 14037

SUBJECT: PROMINENT IBO RETURNS TO NIGERIA

NOT IN VERIFICATION

1. BEN ENWONWU, NOTED NIGERIAN SCULPTOR, RETURNED TO LAGOS YESTERDAY AFTER LONG RESIDENCE IN LONDON. LAGOS PRESS SAYS HE WROTE LETTER TO LONDON PAPERS CALLING FOR QTE: NEW IBO LEADERSHIP, UNQTE BUT IN PROLONGED CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF ENWONWU DENIED MAKING ANY STATEMENT WHATSOEVER.

2. ENWONWU CLEARLY DISTURBED BY OBVIOUS EFFORT OF FMG TO PUBLICIZE HIS RETURN FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES. EMBOFF GOT IMPRESSION THAT ENWONWU MADE DECISION RETURN SIX TO EIGHT WEEKS AGO, BEFORE FULL IMPACT OF FRENCH ASSISTANCE TO BIAFRA REFLECTED IN FIGHTING FRONTS AND THAT HE NOW HAS SOME MISGIVINGS.

3. COMMENT: DESPITE HIS PRIVATE DISCLAIMERS, ENWONWU'S RETURN DOES GIVE BOOST TO FMG CLAIM THAT IBOS CAN LIVE SECURELY INSIDE NIGERIA. IT ALSO INTERESTING THAT ENWONWU IS FROM ONITSHA AREA WHICH HAS PROVIDED MOST LOYALIST IBOS.

GP-4. MATHEWS

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X.R. 12-5 Biafra
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INFO EUR 15, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10,

P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, IO 13, AID 28, ACDA 16, MC 01, SR 01,

ORM 03, RSR 01, /166 W

072184

R 301230Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6926
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS

C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 13900

NOFORN

SUBJECT: NIGERIA: GHANIAN IDEAS FOR OAU ACTION

1. FONOFF'S TEBBIT (ASS'T UNDER SECTY) INFORMS US BRITISH HAVE BEEN TOLD IN CONFIDENCE BY GHANIAN AMB ADDIS THAT AS AND WHEN OAU CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE MEETS IN ADDIS TO DISCUSS NIGERIAN CONFLICT, GHANIANS WILL PROPOSE THAT (A) FMG REITERATE AMNESTY PLEDGE FOR BIAFRAN (PRESUMABLY INCLUDING OJUKWU); (B) OAU SHOULD PUT PRESSURE ON FRENCH TO HALT ARMS SUPPLIES TO BIAFRA; (C) FOUR OAU MEMBERS WHO RECOGNIZE BIAFRA SHOULD BE URGED AGAIN TO PERSUADE OJUKWU TO SEEK NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WITHIN FRAMEWORK ONE NIGERIA. BRUCE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE 00, /070 W

072116

R 301231Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6927
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY PARIS

SECRET LONDON 13901

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: NIGERIA - QUAKER PEACE INITIATIVE

REF: LONDON'S 13758

1. COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT'S GERALD HENSLEY INFORMS US THAT QUAKER REPS VOLKMAR AND MARTIN (REFTEL) FAILED TO CONVINCE BIAFRAN LEADERS TO SEEK NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT NIGERIAN CONFLICT DURING THEIR RECENT VISIT TO UMUHIA. MARTIN WHO WAS IN LONDON LAST WEEKEND TOLD CS OFFICIALS THAT HE AND VOLKMAR SPENT 5 DAYS IN UMUHIA AND DID NOT SEE OJUKWU DURING THAT TIME, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD BEEN PROMISED INTERVIEW WITH HIM BEFORE UNDERTAKING VOYAGE.

2. FIRST THREE DAYS OF VISIT WERE SPENT DOING NOTHING. REPEATED INQUIRIES BY VOLKMAR AND MARTIN ASKING WHEN THEY COULD EXPECT TO SEE OJUKWU AND OTHER BIAFRAN LEADERS, BROUGHT AMBIGUOUS OR EVASIVE REPLIES. FINALLY ON FOURTH DAY MEETING WAS ARRANGED WITH "GRAND COUNCIL" COMPOSED OF MBANEFO, OKPARA, KOGBARA, NJOKU, AKPAN AND TWO OTHERS WHOSE NAMES HENSLEY DID NOT RECALL. AT THIS MEETING QUAKERS PUT FORWARD BRIEF PROPOSALS FOR RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS. THESE HAD BEEN WORKED OUT IN ADVANCE WITH HELP OF CS AND WERE SCRUPULOUSLY NEUTRAL IN TONE ALTHOUGH PREDICATED ON BIAFRAN ACCEPTANCE OF ONE NIGERIA. VOLKMAR AND MARTIN QUICKLY DISCOVERED THAT BIAFRAN LINE HAD HARDENED SIGNIFICANTLY. MBANEFO DELIVERED LONG STATEMENT REVIEWING BIAFRAN POSITION AND CRITICIZING IN HARSH TERMS

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10/30/68*

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By: MWA Date: 10/5/05



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BRITISH AND, TO LESSER EXTENT, US POLICY. HE AND OTHER MEMBERS OF COUNCIL THEN ASSERTED THAT ONLY SUBJECT THEY WOULD DISCUSS WITH FMG WAS FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN BIAFRA AND NIGERIA. THEY WERE NOT WILLING TO DISCUSS EVEN THIS SUBJECT WITHOUT CEASEFIRE, WHICH THEY REGARDED TEST OF FMG'S "GOOD FAITH". IN COURSE OF SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH COUNCIL, QUAKERS WERE UNABLE PERSUADE THEM TO ADOPT MORE FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE.

3. WHEN VOLKMAR AND MARTIN WENT TO LAGOS THEY REPORTED DISCOURAGING RESULTS OF THEIR MISSION TO GEN. GOWON WHO REACTED MILDLY AND SAID HE WAS NOT SURPRISED. HE EXPRESSED SYMPATHY FOR AKPAN AND OKPARA WHO, HE THOUGHT, WERE BASICALLY IN FAVOR OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. GOWON REAFFIRMED THAT DESPITE APPARENT FAILURE OF QUAKER MISSION, FMG REMAINED READY TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS IF AND WHEN BIAFRAN ATTITUDE BECAME MORE REASONABLE.

4. ACCORDING TO HENSLEY, QUAKER REPS DID NOT HAVE MUCH OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE CONDITIONS OUTSIDE Umuahia DURING THEIR VISIT. FROM THEIR LIMITED CONTACTS AND CONVERSATIONS THEY WERE CONVINCED HOWEVER THAT MORALE WAS HIGH, AND SUPPLIES OF BOTH ARMS AND FOOD WERE MUCH MORE ABUNDANT THAN THEY HAD BEEN ON OCCASION QUAKERS' LAST VISIT SIX WEEKS BEFORE. VOLKMAR AND MARTIN NOTICED YOUNG MEN JOGGING ALONG ROAD AND DOING CALISTHENICS NEAR THEIR RESIDENCE IN THE EARLY MORNING, EVIDENTLY PRIOR TO MILITARY INDUCTION. GENERAL MOOD WAS ONE OF CONFIDENCE THAT BIAFRANS HAD TAKEN WORST THAT FMG COULD DEAL OUT. NOW IT WAS SIMPLY MATTER OF HANGING ON UNTIL CONSCIENCE OF WORLD WAS AROUSED AND OTHER COUNTRIES CAME TO BIAFRAN ASSISTANCE. BRUCE

SECRET

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Authority:	VND 954503
By:	MM/ARA Date 10/5/05

L I M D I S
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NEA 8

ACDA 5
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Functional

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0927

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Authority: VMD 954503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

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1				UNCLASSIFIED		NO.	
EUR	FE	NEA	CU	HANDLING INDICATOR			
5				TO : Department of State		NOV 2 8 43 AM 1968	
INR	E	P	IO	INFO : LAGOS, LONDON, PARIS, USUN NEW YORK			
5		2	5	FROM : Amembassy ABIDJAN		DATE: October 30, 1968	
3	FBO	AIO		SUBJECT : Foreign Minister Makes UN Day Statement on Biafra			
S/R	CRM	SCM		REF :			
1	SPAN	2	9/10	United Nations Day was celebrated in Abidjan with a reception given by United Nations UNDP Resident Representative Hans EHRENSTRALE, and broadcast statements by Ehrenstrale, UN Secretary General U Thant, and Foreign Minister Arsene Assouan USHER.			
AGR	COM	FRB	INT	Apart from praising the creation and the peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations, the Foreign Minister devoted much of his statement to the Nigerian war, saying notably:			
LAB	TAR	TR	XMB	"How can we not be moved in this international year of the Rights of Man in the face of the horrible and distressing war which our brothers of Biafra are waging to recover their liberty, fastened in a juridical iron collar constructed to the measure of interests foreign to Africa? How can one not be indignant in the face of the daily ravishment of the fundamental principles of the Declaration of 1948, where some, to maintain their interests and quench their thirst for power, employ force pitilessly at the expense of human lives? And how can we understand the guilty passivity of certain great powers which, to different degrees, feed the fires of this war in which the massacre of the Ibo people constitutes the final goal to be attained?"			
AIR	ARMY	NAVY	OSO	Usher went on to restate the principles of Ivorian policy, non-			
5	3	5	34	UNCLASSIFIED		For Department Use Only	
USIA	NSA	CIA		Drafting Date: 10/29/68		Phone No.: _____	
10	3	20		Contents and Classification Approved by: _____		DCM: L. G. 10/29/68	
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Authority: VND 959503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

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Abidjan A- 505

Page 2

violence, dialogue, and negotiation, and concluded by reiterating
Ivorian support for the United Nations.

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By	MV NARA Date 10/5/05

DEPT. DISTRIBUTION
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LAB	TAR	TR	XMB
AIR	ARMY	NAVY	OSD
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AIRGRAM

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HANDLING INDICATOR
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO : Department of State

ACTION : LAGOS, LISBON, PARIS

ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy LONDON

DATE: October 30, 1968

SUBJECT : American Hank Warton, Gun Supplier to Biafra
Reported to have Broken with Col. Ojukwu

REF :

The Sunday Times (October 27) reported that the Biafrans are no longer buying munitions from Hank Warton, an American who, according to the Times, was the sole supplier of arms to Biafra. Col. Ojukwu was reported to have accused Warton of sabotaging shipments of arms to Biafra during the Federalist "quick kill" summer campaign and just recently when one of Warton's aircraft unloaded munitions and bundles of Biafran bank notes into the sea. Warton, who operates out of Portugal, claimed that his pilots had to dump munitions because of engine troubles and that the Biafrans owe him one million dollars.

The Sunday Times reported that the Portuguese acting on a request from Col. Ojukwu have arrested Warton. The Sunday Times said that the French and Portuguese will now increase their shipments of arms to Biafra.

The Sunday Times also quoted a Biafran official as saying that "more munitions had been landed in Biafra during the past three weeks than for the previous three months."

A picture accompanying the article showed Warton in his office standing next to a US Army recruitment poster.

ENCLOSURE: Article from Times

BRUCE

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
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By: MNA Date: 10/5/03



Hank Warton and secretary Ziggy in Lisbon. Who ever the U S Army wants (see poster), Biafra no longer wants Warton

Gun-runner Warton breaks with Ojukwu: Cubans step in

By Alexander Mitchell

BIAFRA, desperate for arms, and one Mr Hank Warton, until a month ago its sole supplier of same, have broken up their alliance.

The reasons for the divorce, which for the besieged rebels of Nigeria could hardly have come at a worse time, are surrounded in mystery, but include accusations by Biafra of a double-cross by Warton.

This is strongly denied by Warton, an American gun-runner from Miami whose battered Super Constellations flying from Portugal provided Biafra's sole lifeline for so long.

He claimed in Madrid last week that the Biafrans owed him one million dollars. "I let my heart get in the way of my head. I started to make trips without getting paid. Then there was all the extras—the airport fees, maintenance costs. These things mount up," he said.

A month ago he flew to Biafra via Sao Tome, the Portuguese island just off the Nigerian coast which is the main spring-board for supplies to Biafra, to have a showdown with Colonel Ojukwu. But he was told that no further money would be paid to him.

On arrival back on Sao Tome Warton was picked up by the Portuguese police. It was largely a trumped up case; plastic bombs had been found at Lisbon airport (departure point of Warton's planes to Biafra) and Warton had somehow become a suspect.

The likelier explanation is that the Biafrans contacted the Portuguese authorities and asked them to get Warton out of the way.

The Biafrans say they dumped Warton because they believe he was secretly working for the enemy and they accuse him of deliberately sabotaging their arms shipments.

Certainly arms deliveries became very irregular during the crucial weeks from July to September when the Biafrans launched their much-vaunted "quick kill."

But his conflict with the Biafrans really came to a head last month when one of Warton's planes ran into engine difficulties while flying the Biafra air corridor and the entire cargo was discharged into the sea.

The Biafrans were incensed. The exact manifest is not known although one mercenary pilot told me in Lisbon last week the boxes contained anti-tank weapons and hundreds of thousands of pounds in new Biafran notes.

There can be no doubt the cargo was vital.

Warton, naturally, denies that he has double-crossed the Biafrans. "I've been with them right from the start—since October 1966," he says. But he admits that on two occasions he has been approached by British agents and offered bribes to switch allegiances.

Mr Warton's secret visits to London—two in the past two weeks—have not gone unnoticed to the Biafrans, Mr Warton says. "I have some private business to do in Britain," while the Foreign Office said on Friday: "We did not know he was here."

But Hank Warton's record with the Biafrans looks exemplary when placed alongside the activities of other international arms dealers who have been involved with the war.

Documents which came into the possession of the Sunday Times last week show the treachery of the gun runners and the utter naivete of the Biafrans.

Soon after secession, for instance, the Biafrans were anxious to score a psychological as well as an important strategic victory by sinking the Federal frigate Nigeria which was blockading Port Harcourt.

Several schemes were submitted to the Biafran High Command. One of the most startling versions was put by a London businessman who wanted to ram the ship with a smaller craft constructed with a napalm warhead. The floating torpedo was to be directed by remote control radio.

His proposal reads: "The cost of the boat, radio control, explosives and delivery by tug would be about £50,000. We think that a further sum of £450,000 would be sufficient inducement to enable us to employ the best technicians in every phase of the operation."

While the Biafrans were studying this proposal another group of dealers were planning to sell them a torpedo. After convincing the Biafrans that a single torpedo would solve the blockade, they found there were no spare torpedoes lying around Europe's arms markets.

Undaunted, they approached a film company to negotiate the construction of a dummy torpedo—a film prop—which was to be made out of steel and fitted with all the correct-looking mechanisms.

The Biafrans were offered this alternative for £100,000; the film company thought it could do the job for £2,000.

0931

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By: MN NARA Date: 10/5/03

LONDON A- 4859
ENCLOSURE
PAGE 2 of 2

In the event neither of these schemes were launched. Port Harcourt fell to the Federals a few weeks later and Biafra lost its access to the gulf ... and a great naval coup. The loss of Port Harcourt also brought to an abrupt end another maritime adventure which the Biafrans had been sold by a London arms dealer. Biafran representatives in London, Mr Austin Okwes, paid £145,000 for three former Royal Navy torpedo boats which had been sold as surplus for about £10,000 only a few years ago. The vessels got no further than Oporto, in Portugal, and Gibraltar when Port Harcourt was captured. And because the Biafrans never took out legal title over them, the vessels are likely to remain the property of various agents which helped organise the deal. Meanwhile, the supply of arms to Biafra—pouring in from France and Portugal—is now reaching an all-time high. The gap left by the break with Warton has been filled by new operators—Aero Lessor of Florida, with Cuban emigre pilots, Transavia of Amsterdam, Transair of Stockholm. A Biafran official in Lisbon said last week more guns and munitions had been landed in Biafra during the past three weeks than for the previous three months. And a mercenary pilot just back from Sao Tome said a record 22 landings were made in Biafra during one night last week. The night air above the remaining square miles of Biafra, he said, was like Heathrow on a Saturday night as the relief and arms shipments arrived.

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By MVA Date 10/5/05

66

POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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29 OCT 68 22 40Z

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Origin
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS

INFO: Amembassy LISBON
LONDON
PARIS
PORT LOUIS
US MISSION GENEVA
USUN NY
CINGSTRIKE
Amconsul IBADAN
Amconsul KADUNA

PORT LOUIS FOR PALMER

SUBJECT: Nigeria Press Summary - Oct. 29

1. Wash Star Oct 28 has Geneva AP story on Gonard press conference headed starvation threat eases in Biafra. Threat mass starvation Biafra now greatly diminished ICRC reported today. Chairman Samuel Gonard said there has been QTE a great improvement UNQTE in situation and 1,250,000 refugees now receiving adequate care from ICRC including 750,000 Ibos. But he added there still unknown number refugees in bush whose fate not known. In last two months ICRC has distributed 12,000 tons food, medical supplies worth \$6 million to civilian victims both sides. Supplies for next four months, estimated 400,000 tons, either in hand, on way or firmly promised. Director-General Roger Gallopin warned operation depends on access Biafra's one landing strip. If Nigerians capture it, relief bridge from Equatorial Guinea, former Fernando Po, will be broken.

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Drafted by:

AF/P:RLPerkins:mb 10/29/68

Tel. Ext. 2105

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

Nigerian Task Force:RPSmith

Clearances:

AF/CM - Mr. McKesson (by phone)

JM/RP

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By: MWA Date: 10/5/05

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

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2. NYTimes heads same Geneva story Nigerian famine reported eased--drop in starvation deaths found by Red Cross aide. Gonard in addition to above announced his committee determined continue large scale relief effort on both sides, intended seek greater African participation in effort. Gonard said his agency would need \$6.9 million to continue on present scale for next four months. All except \$1.1 million remained to be raised through contributions govts and private relief organizations. Of 12,000 tons distributed by ICRC past two months, 3,500 tons went into Biafra by airlift.

3. Times carries Friendly story Lagos headed food surveys being made. ICRC agricultural specialist completing two-week inspection in secessionist areas seeking determine how much food might be harvested for population there. Others are asking state ministries agriculture in Nigeria what crops they expect produce. These surveys in preparation for new worldwide ICRC appeal funds. ICRC spokesman said problem is QTE we do not know yet how much is available in Nigeria itself nor how many people will need it at any given time. We think cost will run between \$10 million and \$15 million a month for next three months. We think we will need 500 trucks UNQTE. Experts not expected have complete answers by time ICRC meets Geneva Nov 4 to make new requests. QTE Assembling this kind of statistics here is like trying pick up ^{mercury} ~~DECEXX~~ with chopsticks UNQTE remarked American official working on problem in Nigeria. Estimates planned production such starchy staples as cassava and yams which raised by small peasant farmers are unreliable at best, he said. Angry exchange last night at Port Harcourt between Nigerian field commander and international observer group is threatening develop into

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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By MVA/ARA Date 10/5/95

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serious problem for FMG. Argument developed when five observers from Britain, Sweden, Poland and UN, returned to Harcourt after 2-day journey to Urua-Inyang, small village where some Canadian journalists reported fed soldiers recently slaughtered Ibo residents. Observers discovered reports, based Biafran sources, were unfounded. Returning Harcourt group upbraided by Col. Adekunle, 3rd Div Commander, for visiting area without waiting his consent. Observers said they intended raise incident with higher military authorities on return Lagos. In course argument both Adekunle and Col. E. B. M. Pinnington, Canadian rep, suggested observers leave Nigeria. Today visitors allowed tour Aba front, scene recent heavy Biafran counterattack. They expected back in Lagos tomorrow.

4. Wash Post carries story by Alexander Mitchell, London Sunday Times, headed gunrunner is fired by Biafra as saboteur. Biafra and one Hank Warton, until month ago its sole supplier arms, have broken up their alliance. Reasons for divorce, which for besieged rebels could hardly have come at worse time, surrounded in mystery but include Biafran accusations Warton double-cross. This strongly denied by Warton, American gunrunner from Miami whose battered Super-Constellations flying from Portugal provided sole Biafra lifeline for so long. He claimed in Madrid last week Biafrans owe him one million dollars. QTE I let my heart get in way of my head. Then there was all extras - airport fees, maintenance costs. These things mount up UNQTE he said. Month ago he flew Biafra via Sao Tome to have showdown with Ojukwu, and was told no further money would be paid him. Back on Sao Tome Warton picked up by Portuguese police. Plastic bombs had been found Lisbon airport and he had somehow become suspect. ~~Lik~~ Likelier explanation is Biafrans contacted Portuguese

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Page 4 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

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authorities, asked them get Warton out of way. Biafrans say they dumped Warton because they believe he secretly working for enemy and accuse him sabotaging arms shipments. Certainly arms deliveries became very irregular during crucial weeks July to September when fed troops launched much vaunted QTE quick kill UNQTE. But his conflict with Biafrans really came head last month when one of his planes ran into engine difficulties flying Biafran corridor and entire cargo discharged into sea. Warton naturally denies he double-crossed Biafrans. QTE I've been with them right from start - since October 1966 UNQTE. But he admits on two occasions he approached by British agents and offered bribes to switch. His secret visits to London, two in past two weeks, have not gone unnoticed by Biafrans. He said he had private business and Foreign Office says they did not know he was there. But his record with Biafrans looks exemplary when placed alongside activities other international arms dealers involved with war. Documents show treachery gun runners and utter naivete Biafrans. Soon after secession, for example, Biafrans anxious score psychological and important strategic victory by sinking fed frigate Nigeria, which was blockading Port Harcourt. Several schemes submitted Biafran high command, One of most startling ~~xxx~~ versions from London businessman who wanted ram ship with smaller craft constructed with napalm warhead. Floating torpedo to be directed by remote control radio. He asked more than million dollars for job. While Biafrans studying this proposal, another group dealers were planning sell them torpedo. After convincing them single torpedo would solve blockade, they found there were no spare torpedoes lying around Europe's arms markets.

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0936

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By MNA Date 10/5/05

Page ⁵ of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

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Undaunted they approached film company to negotiate construction dummy torpedo, film prop, to be made of steel and fitted with all correct-looking mechanisms. Biafrans offered this alternative for \$290,000; film company thought it could do job for \$4800. Neither of these schemes launched because Harcourt fell to feds few weeks later and Biafra lost access to gulf. Meanwhile supply arms to Biafra now reaching all time high. Gap left by break with Warton being filled by new operators - Aero Lessor of Florida with Cuban emigrant pilots, Transavia of Amsterdam, Transair of Stockholm. Biafran official Lisbon said last week more guns and munitions landed in Biafra during past ~~2~~ three weeks than for previous three months.

5. Post also briefly reports Adekunle-observer confrontation.

END

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0937

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Authority: VND 954503
By: MWA/RA Date: 10/5/05

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 29, 1968
TIME: 3:00 P.M.
PLACE: Department of State

SUBJECT: Tunisian and African Situation

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Mondher Ben Ammar, Tunisian Secretary of State for
Youth and Sports and Social Affairs

Mr. Hamed Ammar, Minister, Tunisian Embassy

Ambassador Moore, Acting Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs

Mr. McClanahan, Country Officer for Tunisia

Copies to: AF (2)
AF/N (3)
CU
Amembassy Tunis

Ambassador Moore said he hoped Mr. Ben Ammar had seen his son Tarak during this visit to Washington. Ambassador Moore recalled that President Bourguiba had mentioned to Secretary Rusk last May during his State Visit that he hoped Tarak could be admitted to a good American college. Certainly Georgetown University was one of our fine educational institutions. Mr. Ben Ammar said his son was pleased with Georgetown and was glad to be able to continue his education, which had been in a series of schools using the English language, at Georgetown.

Ambassador Moore also congratulated Mr. Ben Ammar on the gold and bronze medals won by Tunisian track star Mohamed Gammoudi at the Olympic Games in Mexico City.

Mr. Ben Ammar, in discussing the work of his Ministry, said that the family planning program at the levels of policy, coordination and propaganda is guided by his Ministry. Family planning is going well in Tunisia, the only problems being a shortage of doctors, nurses, and midwives and of technical facilities. There is no religious obstacle and no resistance to the idea by the husbands and wives of child-bearing age.

In a brief review of the African scene, Ambassador Moore said we had been very interested in the resolution on Nigeria adopted by the OAU Chiefs of State at their September meeting in Algiers. The civil war in Nigeria continued to be a troubling and distressing problem. While everyone sympathized with the suffering

(Drafting Office and Officer)

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By: MN NARA Date: 10/5/05

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Research Memorandum

REF-61, October 28, 1968

To : The Secretary
Through: S/D
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *Thomas L. Hughes*
Subject: De Gaulle's Inscrutable Biafran Policy

REF-61

Many observers have been struck by the apparent illogic in the realpolitik of French policy toward Biafra: as Biafran prospects for survival have become prospectively slimmer, France's support for Biafra has increased. This paper examines the French policy on Biafra and tries to identify the factors that seem to have motivated it.

ABSTRACT

The French contribution to the survival of Biafra has been considerable, in the way both of material and diplomatic aid. Yet the French seem to recognize the futility of the Biafran military effort, and they can only hope at best that their support will somehow increase the Biafrans' chances for negotiating a relatively favorable settlement. The French would deny that their assistance is simply prolonging the suffering in Biafra, for they seem convinced that a Federal Military Government (FMG) "victory" would in any case mean "genocide" for the Ibo people. The principal French talking point has been that the Biafrans have earned the right to self-determination, and that a political solution to the conflict must be found which, as de Gaulle has said, takes into account "the personality of the Biafran people."

Since the beginning of the Biafran conflict, the French have embargoed arms shipments to the two principals (although this embargo did not include precession orders until June of this year). Nevertheless, it seems clear

that French-made arms and credits (as well as humanitarian assistance) have

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

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By: MWA Date: 10/5/05

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 28, 1968
Mr. Jacques' Residence

SUBJECT: French Support of Biafra

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Yves Jacques, Counselor, French Embassy
Mr. Raymond J. Wach, AF/W

COPIES TO: AF Embassy Lagos
AFW (2) Embassy Paris
EUR/FBX
INR -10 (16)

Mr. Jacques arranged a private luncheon at his home to discuss the Nigeria-Biafra war. He appeared unusually well informed and interested, in contrast to previous occasions when Mr. Jacques had shown a certain naivete and disinterest in African matters.

It was the reporting officer's impression that Mr. Jacques arranged the discussion to repeat French ideas as well as to probe American policies toward the war and that he expected the discussion to be reported.

1. French Policy Towards Biafra: Mr. Jacques said he had studied the conversation between Under Secretary Katzenbach and French Foreign Minister Debre on October 12, concerning the Nigerian war. Mr. Jacques systematically reiterated all the points that Mr. Debre had put forth (for example, the "right" of Biafrans to self-determination, the wish by France that she had changed her policy towards Biafra earlier) and associated himself with Mr. Debre's remarks. Mr. Jacques gave the impression that Mr. Debre's comments had been staff-prepared and were now French doctrine. He foresaw no withdrawal from this attitude, even if De Gaulle were to step down, since the policy "is not based on personalities."

2. Anticipated Results of French Policy: Mr. Jacques said that France had no idea where her policy of support for Biafra would lead, but of course she could not, as a Christian nation, stand by and see the Biafran people destroyed and all Africa "set back". The French policy was not based on anti-British objectives or "oil politics," (he mentioned that France only changed her policy towards Biafra after the fall of Port Harcourt to the Nigerians. By merely keeping quiet, France could have saved her SAFRAP investment in Nigeria, presuming that a Nigerian victory would bring stability). A defeat for Biafra would probably mean the destruction of the eastern tribes and at best would

AF/W:R. Wach:ba 10/30/68
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By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

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mean second-class citizenship for the eastern peoples for the foreseeable future, with resultant continuing instability. French policy was thus based solely on averting a defeat of Biafra.

Mr. Jacques was of the opinion that the FMG was stable and not in danger of a coup. He thought that the Yorubas had become so involved with the FMG that they were not a threat at the moment. He seemed to feel that a long-drawn-out military stalemate was most probable and was interested, for example, in whether or not Biafra had natural, easily-defended borders.

3. United States Policy Towards Biafra: Mr. Jacques was frankly curious about our attitudes towards the war and our motives. He was reminded that the USG had not intervened in the war, which was a Nigerian, an African and a Commonwealth problem; that we deplored the resort to violence and had counseled against it; that we did not permit American weaponry or munitions to reach either side; and that we regretted the internationalization of the conflict. Humanitarian interests were fundamental to American policy in Africa. Mr. Jacques was impressed by the details of our large relief effort in Nigeria but claimed that relief was useless without peace.

4. Unitary Governments for Africa: Mr. Jacques stressed that African people, who are divided into myriad tribes and tribal groupings, must be organized in unitary governments for mutual protection and equality. He said that France had found that none of her former colonies would agree to remain in federations, although ironically enough some of these former colonies now were insisting on a Nigerian Federation.

5. French Contingency Plans: In response to a query as to whether France was prepared to see through the consequences of open support for Biafra, Mr. Jacques insisted that she was. If Lagos escalates her military efforts, France would increase its assistance to Biafra. "We cannot let Biafra fail", Mr. Jacques said.

Mr. Jacques reiterated several times that the Nigeria-Biafra conflict is "another Spanish civil war". He was referring to the sending of "volunteers" to both sides by various major powers and possibly to the involvement of the USSR.

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By	MV NARA Date 10/5/05

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OSD	USIA	NSA
34	10	3
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

PL 27 BIAFRA -
NIGERIA
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QDFN 10 NIGERIA
HANDLING INDICATOR

A-904
NO.

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : BONN, GENEVA, LONDON, PARIS

FROM : Amembassy LAGOS

SUBJECT : Financing Biafra

REF : Lagos 13844

RECEIVED
OCT 20 9 28 AM 1968

ADVISORY BRANCH
DATE: October 26, 1968

file

The October 19, 1968 edition of West Africa magazine includes a well reasoned but perhaps understated study of the foreign currency available to Biafra during the six-month period, April through September 1968, prior to the commencement of significant arms shipments through Gabon. Written by a Mr. Kennedy Lindsay of the University of the West Indies, the article was summarized in the Lagos Daily Times and has undoubtedly lent greater credence locally to a recent Nigerian allegation that the ICRC has supplied the rebels with over \$3 million in hard currency in exchange for Biafran currency to effect local purchases. The ICRC has denied the Nigerian charge, and Ambassador LINDT has informed us privately that ICRC local currency-needs within Biafra have probably not exceeded \$14,000. Food and other supply requirements for use by ICRC teams operating in the rebel-held area are flown in from Fernando Po by the ICRC.

The West Africa article, however, points out that aid organizations and missionaries have provided Biafra with the greatest single source of foreign exchange to finance the rebellion in the period preceding the massive influx of arms flights through Libreville. The author makes no attempt to estimate foreign revenue received through subventions from foreign governments and businesses, but concludes that hard currency received solely from overt sources was sufficient to account for probable Biafran foreign currency spending during the six-month period.

Enclosure: (UNCLAS.)
"Financing Biafra's War"
West Africa, October 19, 1968

GROUP 3: Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: ECON:RKKuchel:slt 10-24-68

Clearances:

Contents and Classification Approved by:
William G. Jones, Economic Counselor

William G. Jones

1968 OCT 28 AM 10 37

COPYELO-PBR

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Authority: VND 954503
By: MWA Date: 10/3/05

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Lagos A-904
PAGE TWO

The author identifies six overt sources of foreign exchange available to Biafra and makes the following conservative estimates of receipts for the six-month period, April-September, 1968:

1. Local currency requirements of foreign missionaries: £ 200,000
(an average of 250, each spending locally £800 of his foreign paid salary and allowances)
2. Local currency requirements of non-missionary expatriates: £ 250,000
(average of 250, each spending an estimated £1,000)
3. Local spending by foreign missionary societies, overseas churches and aid organizations: £ 278,000
(includes expatriate salaries)

The author includes: Presbyterian Church in Canada (£10,000); Interdenominational Port Harcourt Project (£8,000); American Baptists (£10,000); Catholic Church groups in Britain and Ireland (£180,000); Oxfam (£20,000); Aid-Biafra groups (£33,000): the author excludes "fairly generous" grants by Caritas, Catholic Relief Services, and World Council of Churches for which figures are not available.

4. Contributions by overseas Ibo communities: £ 125,000
5. Biafran Government purchases of gold and silver jewellery from Ibo women of Biafra for overseas sale: £ 250,000
6. Exports of rubber, other commodities, on re-turning supply aircraft: £ 50,000

TOTAL ESTIMATED FOREIGN
REVENUE


£1,153,000
(\$3,228,400)

The author estimates that Biafra spent £350,000 for supply planes and overseas shipping, £60,000 for six overseas missions, and £70,000 for publicity firms in the U.S., U.K. and Switzerland. This leaves a balance of £673,000 for purchases of ammunition, weapons and other war requirements.

The article concludes that well over half of Biafra's foreign revenue in the six-month period (£613,000) was derived from payments made within the country by aid organizations and missionaries. To be fair, it is well to recognize the Nigeria has certainly received far greater sums of foreign

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PAGE THREE

exchange from foreign missionaries and aid organizations. The editors of West Africa make but scant reference to this in their introduction to Mr. Lindsay's article.

The West Africa article has stimulated the British High Commission in Lagos in attempting to obtain a better estimate of the foreign currency available to Biafra to finance the war effort. The High Commission understands that the German Evangelical Church has raised between £1 million and £1.5 million for assistance to Biafra, although the portion spent for local purchases and expenses within Biafra is not known. In addition to mission and aid sources, the French are understood to be granting financial aid to Biafra. The referenced telegram reports that the Canadians know of a French deposit of \$12 million in Ojukwu's favor in a Moroccan bank. The DCM recently spoke to a prominent Ibo businessman who had been in rebel areas until the capture of Owerri on September 16 and who stated that the rebels had received one million pounds sterling each from the World Council of Churches, Caritas and a German church group. These funds were reportedly given for the purchase of local foodstuffs in Biafra. The British High Commission has asked British missions to Washington, Paris, Berne, Bonn and Dublin, as well as the Foreign Office, for further information on the amounts of "humanitarian" and other funds being made available to Biafra. The Department may wish to do the same.

MATHEWS



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Authority: VND 959503
By: MVA/ARA Date: 10/5/05

Financing Biafra's War

How did Biafra finance the war after the exhaustion of the foreign currency with which she entered the war, and before massive aid began to arrive through Gabon? Kennedy Lindsay, of the University of the West Indies, here attempts an answer. He is not concerned with criticising the selfless work of relief or other organisations, but only to show one, entirely unintended, consequence of their work. The Federation's fund currency reserves are helped in the same way.

THE six months from the beginning of April to the end of September are a distinct period in Biafran war finance. At the beginning of April resources were at a low ebb. The foreign currency with which Biafra entered the war was spent. Her pilots were frequently unpaid and she was trying to buy arms on credit at six times their market value. Six months later, in September, came the military aid from Gabon.

Biafra's ability to continue to finance her war during those six months has frequently been attributed to help from China, South Africa, France, or Portugal. Apart from a little non-financial assistance from Portugal, the evidence is against such explanations. Further, an examination of the sources of foreign currency at Biafra's disposal shows that these were sufficient to account for her spending.

The almost complete blockade of Biafra greatly simplifies calculations of her probable receipts of foreign revenue. A person, or organisation, wishing to transfer money into the country pays it into the London or other branch of the African Continental Bank and an equivalent sum is released in Biafra in Biafran currency which, in theory, can be printed on blank paper. The sum paid to the bank immediately becomes available to the Biafran government as external revenue and is available for any expenditure.

At the moment there are slightly under 250 missionaries of all denominations in Biafra. In April the number was a little

higher. If one assumes that there was an average of 250 over the period April-September and that each spent locally £800 of his foreign paid salary and allowances, the total would be £200,000.

The number of non-missionary expatriates drawing salaries from foreign sources is more difficult to estimate. After the fall of Port Harcourt it probably dropped to well below 100. By the end of September it had risen to at least 550 as the aid enterprises gathered momentum. Some, such as Swedes and Americans, had impressive salaries while others were less well-paid. The cost of living is exceptionally high in Biafra and one could take an average of £1,000 of local spending per person over the six months and be confident that it is an underestimate. That figure together with the assumption that there was an average of 250 non-missionary expatriates would give the sum of £250,000.

The missionary societies, overseas churches, and aid organisations spent substantial sums locally in Biafra between April and September in addition to expatriate salaries. Neither of the two largest Protestant missionary bodies working in the area reduced their normal budgets although their expatriate personnel had been drastically reduced. Part of the budgets go in salaries to missionaries who have been withdrawn, but the remainder is available for spending in Biafra.

The Presbyterian Church in Canada made

a gift of £10,000 to the Presbyterian Church in Biafra. This was particularly appreciated by the Biafran government as it came in April when its foreign currency was low. The interdenominational Port Harcourt Project gave £8,000 for work in Biafra as distinct from its normal work in the Port Harcourt area. American Baptists and other smaller American churches contributed about £10,000 to co-religionists in Biafra for local spending.

The Catholics are by far the largest missionary group in Biafra. It has been particularly difficult to obtain figures for their expenditure on local projects. One church official estimated that sums contributed from the UK and Irish Republic might be about £180,000, but emphasised that there had been in addition considerable sums from European countries, the United States, and French Canada.


Oxfam gave £20,000 for purchase of food locally in Biafra. This included £5,000 to Catholic relief work and £5,000 to the Protestant-controlled Queen Elizabeth Hospital at Umuahia.

Caritas Internationalis and the U.S. Catholic Relief Services were at one stage fairly generous in their grants for relief spending within Biafra, but figures are not available. The World Council of Churches and Norchurchaid also made contributions for local spending, but on a smaller scale.

The various "aid-Biafra" groups in Europe, the United States, and the British Isles are said to have raised £100,000 in recent months, but one-third of that sum might be more accurate.

In the British Isles and North America there are three or four thousand Ibos in employment and there are Ibo communities in most West African countries. These have probably contributed £125,000 or

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October 19, 1968

WEST AFRICA

1229

more to Biafran revenues between April and September. Even a city like Toronto has its Ibo organization loyally raising money from fellow Ibos and outsiders.

The Ibo women of Biafra may have possessed about £1m. of gold, silver and other jewellery at the time of secession. They are particularly fond of the almost pure gold ornaments made by the local goldsmiths. They have been selling this jewellery gradually as the cost of living soared. The Biafran Government has been the chief buyer and from this source it has probably obtained about £250,000 in foreign revenue between April and September. All foreign currency sent to Biafra, regardless of what it is spent on or by whom, ends up by being at the secessionists' disposal—as happens with foreign currency payments in any country.

Returning supply aircraft have been used to fly out small quantities of exports. Rubber appears to have been the main commodity, but the total proceeds over the six months are probably not £50,000.

Ignoring the foreign revenue received for which no figures can be allocated, Biafra's total foreign revenue between April and September was thus £1,153,000. Possible figures for three important items of expenditure were: £350,000 for supply planes and ocean shipping; £60,000 for six overseas missions and other representations abroad; and £70,000 for publicity firms in the United States, United Kingdom and Switzerland. When these items are deducted, £673,000 remains for spending on ammunition, essential equipment, intelligence, and other war requirements.

This is a small sum by western military standards, but is impressive in the Biafran context. By April Biafra's primary requirement was small arms ammunition, which is not particularly expensive, but is the key to an infantry war with limited numbers of troops on both sides. For instance, the battles for Aba and Owerri probably cost the Biafrans about £100,000 each in ammunition and equipment.

From the figures given above it can be shown that about £613,000 of Biafra's foreign revenue was due to payments made within the country by aid organisations and missionaries. (It is assumed that £165,000 of the non-missionary expatriate salary money spent locally was spent by aid personnel.) This was well over half of Biafra's foreign revenue.

0946

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Authority	VND 954503
By	MN NARA Date 10/3/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

5
POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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1968 OCT 26 AM 9 28

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Cat. C - Caption and custody
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Reviewed by: Ambassador W. Witman, II
Date: *3/12* 1975

Libreville 1883
10/26/68

1. WE UNABLE AT THIS POINT SHED ANY LIGHT ON REPORT IMPORTANT MEETING RE BIAFRA HELD LIBREVILLE ABOUT OCT 16-17. THUS FAR, ASIDE FROM PRESENCE HOUPHOUET'S PLANE OCT 15-18, WE HAVE NOTHING TO INDICATE SUCH MEETING POSSIBLY TOOK PLACE; ON OTHER HAND, WE HAVE NOTHING TENDING SUGGEST IT DID NOT OCCUR. IF SUCH MEETING HELD, KNOWLEDGE OF IT UNDOUBTEDLY CLOSELY CONFINED TO BONGO, PERHAPS ONE OR TWO MOST RELIABLE OF HIS LIEUTENANTS, AND FEW KEY FRENCHMEN. AS DEPT AWARE, DUE SITUATION AND OUR POSITION HERE OUR SOURCES FEW AND OF LIMITED UTILITY AND WE MUST RELY HEAVILY FOR ANY INFO WE ABLE GATHER ON OUR OWN OBSERVATION.

2. ALTHOUGH WE HESITATE SPECULATE ON BASIS SUCH PAUCITY INFO, WE WONDER WHETHER MEETING, IF HELD, RELATED TO APPARENT MOUNTING OPTIMISM HERE THAT ARMS SHIPMENTS HAVE NOW TURNED TIDE IN FAVOR BIAFR, OPTIMISM WHICH WE THINK MAY PRESAGE STEP-UP IN ARMS SHIPMENTS. THIS IS SUBJECT SEPTTEL TODAY'S DATE. GP 1 BANE
BT

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0947

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Authority: *VND 959503*


By: *MW* Date: *10/5/05*

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 ADDIS 06306 261057Z

21
ACTION AF 16

INFO: EUR 15, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10,
P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SA 01, AID 28, RSR 01, IO 13, SAH 02,
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R 261025Z OCT 68
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INFO AMCONSUL ASMARA
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USUN NEW YORK 436
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 6306

REF: ADDIS 6296

1. AMB COX (LIBERIA) TOLD ME LAST NIGHT IEG HAS RESPONDED
NEGATIVELY TO PRESIDENT TUBMAN'S EXPLORATION POSSIBLE MEET-
ING HEADS OF STATE OAU CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE. IEG PRE-
PERS AWAIT RESULTS HIM APPEALS TO OJUKUWA AND EFFORT SEND
LOWER LEVEL REPS OF COMMITTEE TO BIAFRA. COX SAID HE WAS
NOT PRESSING FOR COMMITTEE MEETING.


2. HE REPORTED RUMOR OAU CIRCLES FRENCH SUPPLY ARMS BIAFRA
INVOLVES NOT ONLY EFFORT CONTROL NIGERIAN OIL BUT ALSO
URANIUM DISCOVERIES IN AREA HELD BY BIAFRIANS. HE COM-
MENTED THIS SEEMED FAR-FETCHED BUT IT DIFFICULT EXPLAIN
SUDDEN BURST FRENCH ACTIVITY ON OTHER GROUNDS.

3. DR. S. T. QUANSAH, GHANAIAN OAU REP, TOLD MISSION
OFFICER OCTOBER 24 OAU HAS BEEN INFORMED FRENCH HAD SENT
800 TROOPS FROM GABON INTO BIAFRA. HALL

(1)
MICROFILMED BY RS/N

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66



Department of State

POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA
TR BG 20 ENUGU

TELEGRAM

*13909
10-25-68*

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 13909 251137Z

46
ACTION AFI 16

INFO USIE 00, AID 28, IGA 02, PC 15, OC 06, CCO 00, OI 02, PER 02, OPR 02, LI 03,

SY 03, INR 07, CIAE 00, NSA 02, DODE 00, RSRI 01, RSC 01, ST 01, /091 W
049009

RI 251015Z OCT 68
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3252

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SUBJECT: U.S. PROPERTY AT ENUGU

REF: STATE 170379 OF MAY 25 AND 196494 OF JULY 4.

JOINT EMBASSY/USIS/USAID/PEACE CORPS

EMBASSY FINALLY SUCCESSFUL IN ATTEMPTS TO SEND TEAM TO ENUGU. FIVE MEMBER TEAM FLOWN IN VIA CHARTERED AIRCRAFT ON OCT 6 AND REMAINED THROUGH OCT 9. WACASC TRUCK ACCOMPANIED BY EMB OFF IN PC JEEP MADE OVERLAND TRIP VIA LAKOUA FERRY ARRIVING ENUGU 8 OCT. ALL TELECOMMUNICATION AND SOME AID EQUIPMENT RECOVERED IN APPARENT GOOD CONDITION AND RETURNED VIA TRUCK ARRIVING LAGOS 12 OCT. SINCE LAST VISIT BY EMB/OFF ENUGU IN MAY, CONTINUED LOOTING HAS OCCURRED. SURVEY CONDUCTED OF ALL USG PROPERTIES. NO PROPERTY FOR WHICH UNIT VALUE WOULD EXCEED EVACUATION COSTS REMAIN. NO PERSONAL EFFECTS OF ANY PERSONNEL COULD BE FOUND EXCEPT POV BELONGING TO MULVEHILL/USIS WHICH BEING DRIVEN BY NAFI PILOTS. CAR IN VERY POOR CONDITION AND WILL PROBABLY BE ABANDONED IN NEAR FUTURE. RECOMMEND FINAL PAYMENT BE MADE ON ALL CLAIMS FOR PERSONAL PROPERTY LEFT IN ENUGU. MATHEWS

②

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262180
25 OCT 68 22 45
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Origin
Info

ACTION: AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
STATE 262180

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REF: Libreville 1867

1. Highly sensitive intelligence information indicated^s that important meeting concerning Biafra held in Libreville about October 16-17. Presence Houphouet's plane (reftel) possibly relevant.

2. Interested^{any} information you may develop concerning Biafran or other reps in attendance and substance of meeting. (If no reference made to this message or its contents, your reply need not be NODIS.) END

GP-1

NODIS REVIEW	
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Reviewed by: Ambassador W. Witman, II	
Date: 3712	1975

RUSK

Drafted by:

INR/RAF: J. B. Goldman

Tel. Ext.

5077

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: INR/OD: TLHughes

Clearances:

INR/RAF: OLTroxel, Jr: AFCW - Mr. Schauffele: S/S - Mr. Brown
(in draft)

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Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

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
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TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 582

PAGE 01 LAGOS 13912 251354Z

49

ACTION: AF 16

INFO: EUR 15, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SAH 02, AID 28, NIC 01,

ACDA 16, PC 04, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 02, RSR 01, 178 W
048025

R 251130Z OCT 68.

FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3255

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

STOCKHOLM 039

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION USUN NY

CINCSRIKE/CINCMCAFSA

DIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L LAGOS 13912

SUBJECT: FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER GROUP

REF: LAGOS 13833; LAGOS A-902

1. WE HAVE LEARNED FROM UKHICOM THAT OBSERVERS HAD MEETING ON OCT 22 WITH GOBIR, PERMSEC OF MINDEFENCE, TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE REORGANIZATION OF GROUP AFTER INITIAL TWO-MONTH PERIOD ENVISAGED IN TERMS OF REFERENCE.

2. GEN ALEXANDER REPORTED TO HICOMER THAT PERMSEC UNENTHUSIASTIC AND REMARKED FMG WISHED QTE TO REVIEW THE POSITION AFTER PHASE ONE. UNQTE PROJECT WAS EXPENSIVE, AND QTE QUESTIONS ASKED BY FEDERAL AND PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS MIGHT HAVE BEEN ADEQUATELY ANSWERED WHEN GROUP'S FINAL REPORT ON PHASE ONE IS SUBMITTED. UNQTE

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CONFIDENTIAL

0953

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Authority: VND 950503
By: MN NARA Date: 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LAGOS 13912 251354Z

3. ON OCT 23 UKHICOMER REPORTED TO LONDON: QTE THE IMPRESSION WHICH ALEXANDER GATHERED, THAT FMG MIGHT POSSIBLY BE THINKING OF WINDING UP WHOLE OPERATION AFTER THE QUOTE FINAL REPORT UNQUOTE WAS ISSUED, IS SO ALARMING THAT I CALLED ON ENAHORO (MEA) THIS MORNING TO SEE WHETHER THERE WAS ANY TRUTH IN IT. HE WAS ASTONISHED AT THE SUGGESTION AND TELEPHONED IN MY PRESENCE TO GOBIR, WHO VIGOROUSLY REPUDIATED IT. HE SAID, AS WE KNEW, THAT FMG WERE CONSIDERING A REORGANISATION OF METHOD OF WORKING OF OBSERVER TEAM. BUT BOTH HE AND ENAHORO REITERATED THE GREAT IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO ITS CONTINUING OPERATION. UNQTE

4. COMMENT: WHILE FMG IS OBVIOUSLY NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT EXPANDING OBSERVER GROUP, IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THEY WILL DISCHARGE IT PREMATURELY. IT WOULD BE A GREAT MISTAKE IF THEY DID.
GP-3 MATHEWS:

CONFIDENTIAL

0954

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 959503
By	MW NARA Date 10/5/05



Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**
32

CONFIDENTIAL 581

PAGE 01 IBADAN 00652 251401Z

44
ACTION AF 16

INFO NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, AID 28, IO 13, RSR 01, /130 W
048067

R 251135Z OCT 68
FM AMCONSUL IBADAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 657
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMCONSUL KADUNA
CINCSSTRIKE/CINCMCAFSA

C O N F I D E N T I A L IBADAN 652

SUBJECT: MILITARY MISCELLANY

REF: IBADAN 618; A-139

1. COLONEL OBASANJO, CO IBADAN GARRISON AND CHIEF ARMY ENGINEER, TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT BAILEY BRIDGING MATERIALS NOW IN LAGOS FOR REPAIR. NIGER RIVER BRIDGE. HE CLAIMED ALL DEBRIS CLEARED FROM BRIDGE, BUT HE NOT MOVING MATERIALS OR PROCEEDING WITH REPAIRS UNTIL COL HARUNA (CO SECOND DIV) GOT THE REBELS AWAY FROM THE ONITSHA END OF THE BRIDGE. HE SAID: "MY MEN CANNOT FIGHT WITH SPANNER IN ONE HAND AND GUN IN OTHER." OBASANJO ADMITTED: "THINGS ARE NOT GOOD ON THE ONITSHA FRONT."

2. HARUNA CLAIMED HE NOT PARTICULARLY HAMPERED BY LACK OF BRIDGE AS HE HAS THREE FERRIES WHICH CAN CROSS RIVER WITH UP TO EIGHT TON TRUCK IN 10-20 MINUTES.

3. WHEN REFERENCE MADE TO ADEKUNLE'S CONSTANT CLAIMS OF MERCENARIES, BOTH HARUNA AND OBASANJO VOLUNTEERED THAT NEITHER ONE OF THEM HAD AS YET SEEN SINGLE MERCENARY, EITHER DEAD OR ALIVE.

4. OBASANJO SAID 400 NEWLY TRAINED RECRUITS WHICH MOVED FROM TRAINS TO TRUCKS THROUGH IBADAN YESTERDAY DESTINED FOR THE ONITSHA FRONT.

GP-3. MITHOEFFER

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Authority	VND959503
By	MM NARA Date 10/5/05



Department of State

TELEGRAM

Pol 1 NOR
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Pol 27-1 COM 0100-0100

Pol 27 0100-0100 - NIGERIA
Pol 27-14 UN

CONFIDENTIAL 110

PAGE 01 OSLO 07124 251909Z

49

ACTION EUR 20

INFO IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SAH 02, SAL 01, E 15, NIC 01, RSR 01,

/125 W

050321

R 251620Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2082
INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
USUN NEW YORK 102

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 7124

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE OPENS WITH FONMIN REVIEW
COMMENTS

1. FONMIN LYNG'S OCTOBER 24 FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW, REPORTED
SEPTTEL, SCHEDULED FOR DEBATE OCT 9. REVIEW EMPHASIZED
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND NIGERIA AND LABOR PARTICIPANTS IN FOLLOWING
DEBATE MOST LIKELY PRESS LYNG FOR MORE DETAILED REPORT
ON VIETNAM SITUATION AND MORE COMPLETE EXPOSE NORWEGIAN POLICY
WITH REGARD TO IT, INCLUDING ACTIVITIES AS REPORTED IN
PRESS. (OSLO 7048) Pol 15-VIETS Pol 27 VIETS

2. FONOFF: SOURCES HAVE TOLD US LYNGS VAGUE PROPOSALS IN HIS
UNGA SPEECH FOR EXTENSION UN PEACEKEEPING AND HUMANITARIAN
MANDATE CAME AS SURPRISE TO THEM AS FONOFF HAD NO SPECIFIC
PROPOSALS TO MAKE. SINCE HIS RETURN FROM UNGA IT CLEAR LYNG
WANTS TO DO SOMETHING IN THIS AREA AND RAISING PROPOSALS
AGAIN IN PARLIAMENTARY REVIEW CAME AS NO SURPRISE. HOWEVER,
OUR SOURCES REPORT THAT NEITHER LYNG NOR HIS STAFF ENTIRELY
CLEAR WHAT CAN BE DONE OR EVEN WHAT MECHANISM BEST SUITED
TO CONVERTING WHAT IS PRESENTLY VAGUE SUGGESTION INTO
DETAILED NORWEGIAN (OR NORDIC) PROPOSAL.

GP-3. TIBBETTS.

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Authority: VND 9509503
By: MNA Date: 10/5/05



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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Pol INOR
X 2 Pol 27-1COMBLOC-CZECH
Pol 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

UNCLASSIFIED 602

PAGE 01 DSLO 07123 260030Z

85
ACTION EUR 20

INFO ID 13 AF 10 ACDA 16 SAH 02 SAL 01 SA 01 AID 28 ORMI 03 SR 01

NEA 13 EA 10 NIC 01 RSR 01 120 W

051538

R 251700Z DCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2081
INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
USUN NEW YORK 101

UNCLAS OSLO 7123

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE OPENS WITH FONMIN REVIEW

1. SUMMARY: FONMIN JOHN LYNCH OPENED ANNUAL PARLIAMENTARY FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE OCTOBER 24 WITH REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION EMPHASIZING CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND NIGERIA. LYNCH PRESENTATION WHICH HEAVY ON DETAILS OF UNFOLDING OF EVENTS DURING SUMMER WHEN PARLIAMENT NOT IN SESSION DID NOT DEPART IN ANY WAY FROM WELL-KNOWN NORWEGIAN POSITIONS. PRESS RECEPTION REFLECTS ROUTINE NATURE OF SPEECH. END SUMMARY.

2. LYNCH SAID HE DEVOTED MOST OF SPEECH TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND NIGERIA SINCE SITUATIONS THERE HAD DEVELOPED WHILE STARTING RECESSED/FONMIN ALSO TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON MIDDLE EAST AND VIETNAM AND RAISED AGAIN SUGGESTION THAT UN INSTITUTIONS BE EQUIPPED TO DEAL MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH CRISES OF HUMANITARIAN NATURE.

3. SCZECHOSLOVAKIA COURSE OF EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA OBVIOUSLY BOUND TO AFFECT FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY FORMULATED WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF NATO STATES IN RECENT YEARS HAVE BASED OVERALL POLICY FIRST ON JOINT DEFENSE POLICY CAPABLE OF GIVING REASONABLE GUARANTEES FOR AUTONOMY AND INTEGRITY AND SECOND ON FOREIGN POLICY AIMED AT CREATING STABLE CONDITIONS IN EUROPE AND ATLANTIC AREA AND AT

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10-25-68

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Authority VND 950503
By MN NARA Date 10/3/05

66



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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TELEGRAM

*Admiral Chaka 6296
10-25-68*

CONFIDENTIAL 676

PAGE 01 ADDIS: 06296 251522Z

53
ACTION: AFI 16

INFO: EUR 15, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INRI 07, LI 03, NSC 10,

PI 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SA 01, AID 28, RSR 01, Y 133 W
048398

RI 251415Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7443
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MASERU
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

CONFIDENTIAL ADDIS ABABA 6296

MASERU FOR PALMER

REF: KINSHASA 12201 *file 27 Biafra Nigeria*

ACTING FONMIN TESFAYE HAS TOLD US: HIM SEES LITTLE ADVANTAGE IN
CALLING MEETING CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE HEADS OF STATE AT THIS
TIME AT LEAST PENDING RESULTS OF APPROACH TO OOUKWU BY LOWER
LEVEL CONSCOM GROUP (ADDIS: 6246). OAU SEC GEN TELT HAS TOLD
BRITHS AMB THAT HE EXPECTS LOWER LEVEL GROUP TO ASSEMBLE
SHORTLY IN ADDIS. WILL SEEK CONFIRM ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE AGREEMENT
YET TO BE REACHED ON LOWER LEVEL COMMITTEE HALL

MICROFILMED BY RS/A

①

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Authority: VND959503
By: MNA Date: 10/5/05

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By: MN NARA Date: 10/5/05

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Classification

POL 27-9 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

24 OCT 68 21 45z

FOR OCIT USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LAOGS

Info:

INFO: Amembassy LONDON
MASERU
PARIS
US MISSION GENEVA
USUN N.Y.
CINGSTRIKE
Ameonsul IBADAN
Amconsul KADUNA

MASERU FOR PALMER

SUBJECT: Nigeria Press Summary - October 24

1. Last summary was October 21.
2. Wash Post carries Astrachan story Lagos headed slow pace of Nigerian conflict raises three tactical questions. Solutions to three military questions may have as much effect on timing, nature end of civil war as do basic reasons for its slow pace. Federal army superior in equipment and manpower, has in 15 months reduced Biafran territory to tenth of original size by series brief campaigns alternating with two or three months little action and less movement. Current situation appears approaching stalemate because Biafran resistance increased as rebel supplies have risen since September with French help; because fed supply lines overextended and neither reinforcements nor arms arrive when needed and because West African fighting styles preclude sustained rapid advance. This may change if Biafra switches to offensive or if feds

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Drafted by:

AF/P:RLPerkins:mb 10/24/68

Tel. Ext.
2105

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Nigerian Task Force-RMMelbourne

Clearances:

9

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FORM
8-65 DS-322

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Authority: VMD 954503
By: MWA Date: 10/3/05

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

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
finally assault few remaining Biafran towns. But change in basic pattern likely depend on answers these questions which puzzle many foreign observers.

1) Why doesn't Nigeria destroy or interdict airstrips used by Biafra for relief and military supplies? Answer to this ~~xxxx~~ apparent. Migs cannot operate at night, ill-designed for bombing that can damage airstrip beyond easy repair. Egyptian pilots unwilling fly low enough in face antiaircraft fire maximize damage planes can do, and not enough Nigerian trained pilots take over. Ground attacks on strips frustrated by heavy Biafran defenses, including mined roads and mile-long zigzag trenches four feet deep. Meaningful artillery attack impossible until feds get within seven miles of strips. 2) Why don't Biafrans adopt Vietcong tactics now they squeezed in heartland? Center remaining Biafran territory honeycombed paved roads and bush trails, feds cannot hold them all. They vulnerable guerrilla attacks from back trails and to night raids. Biafrans have staged some such attacks and shot up towns deep in fed-held territory but have not sustained these actions. One suspects they have not enough trained soldiers combine Vietcong approach with frontal defenses or enough ideological motivation for long term guerrilla war. 3) What happens when Biafrans have ~~no~~ no place left to run? So far few pitched battles in war. Only Onitsha suffered heavy combat damage; other towns show only bullet holes, looting, peripheral damage. Civilians fled each town as feds approached, and Biafran army moved out too making stands nearby rather than in town itself. Liberated towns Ibo territory virtually empty of civilians.

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
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Where they went another question. Must be at least six million Ibos unaccounted for. Most may be in dwindling Biafra, but probably millions in bush on federal side of lines as well. Even if feds take Umuahia, Orlu, Bende and bigger remaining villages and every main road in Biafra, they may still not be able find the people. That will make rebuilding Nigeria much harder, but poses no military ^{threat} ~~threat~~ unless bush people take to guerrilla war, which impossible maintain once airstrips in fed hands. On other hand, Biafrans may be forced fight in town or populated bush areas, increasing possibility thousands civilians will be mowed down in careless firing characterizing this war.

3. Stephen Rosenfeld, Post editorial writer, has signed column headed hunger in Biafra: world harbinger. Gist is that plight of as many as five or ten thousand dying daily of starvation Nigeria whose plight has elicited enormous humanitarian concern around world. Seeming inability international community separate what patronizingly called politics from hunger issue widely deplored and blamed for sweep of tragedy. Doubtless this is so to degree and one would not wish condone any action which kept available food from mouths of dying. Yet there undeniable and curious aspect blindness to world's humanitarianism in Nigerian instance. For great many Nigerians would be dying anyway from various consequences of eating badly and rest of world would not be fussing much about it. And at this moment great many people outside Nigeria dying of hunger without benefits international human concern. Nothing so dull as strangers dying at distance. War in Nigeria has exacerbated hunger problem but not created it, and after war over and

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world's attention turned elsewhere problem will remain. War has not only intensified problem; it has publicized it. Life pictures cited. We read for instance kwashiorkor claiming many lives in Nigeria. I had never heard of it. Turns out be one of commonest diseases in world. With its partner marasmus paren I never heard of that either close paren it afflicts up to ten percent and more of poor countries' children of preschool age. When it comes to dying rich are different. They die of cancer, heart failure, ~~inde~~ identifiable things like that. In poor countries big killers are diseases of childhood resulting combination infection and malnutrition. Five thousand Nigerians starving daily sounds and is frightful. Yet accepted world figure of 10,000 deaths daily from malnutrition is routine and unremarked. There is an ugly sense in which human devastation in Nigeria merely harbinger of tidal wave of starvation poised on horizon. Beyond pity and recrimination world's response to Nigerian tragedy is relief, quick burst humanitarianism. We read of midnight mercy missions; so protracted is emergency Steve Canyon comic strip has caught up with it. Yet however emotionally necessary provision of relief is to donors, it physically inadequate to recipients. Hunger in Nigeria as elsewhere too profound be left to intermittent impulses charity. Can only properly be approached in institutional ways; more food, more population control, more development, more self-help, more aid.

4. Reuters Lagos reports October 24 ICRC being forced cut back already meager rations according ICRC spokesman there. He said ICRC plans

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launch worldwide appeal more funds in next two weeks aimed generally at various govts and particularly USG. Officials Geneva compiling list requirements likely top ten million dollars month. With present funds ICRC could afford continue Nigerian relief operations about two more months. Knowledgeable British source returning from Biafra this week said virtually only food left in Abak area where there 35 refugee camps was dried milk and this could not be used because ICRC had no money buy garri with which milk mixed. Basic ration one pound rice, beans, cereal or powered wheat and five ounces fish or milk a week for children in camps cut because of financial difficulties. Same applied to double ration given adults said source. Estimates vary number refugees in southeastern state but they believed range between 130,000 and 250,000 with thousands more still hiding in bush. Position became worse this week with arrival 30,000 to 80,000 Annang tribesmen who source said were freed ~~ng~~ after retreating with Biafran troops. Meanwhile diplomatic sources said Biafrans building new airstrip to supplement Uli-Ihiala. Witnesses saw perforated aluminum strip being transported along road 10 miles northeast Orlu, which 25 miles west Umuahia. In addition they said be ~~bx~~ building another strip north of Umuahia, but not known what type aircraft it can handle. Diplomatic sources also said recent flow arms into Biafra and extended fed supply lines seem be hitting FMG fources south Umuahia. Aba said he QTE in trouble UNQTE. News reports from front indicated fed troops pushed back from point eight miles north Aba during past three weeks.

END

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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Authority VND 954503
By MVA/ARA Date 10/5/05

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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 142

PAGE 01 YAOUND 02324 241750Z

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ACTION SS 70

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INFO CIAE 00, /070 W

042695

R 241055Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
TO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 2566

C O N F I D E N T I A L YAOUNDE 2324

SUBJ: NIGERIA

REF: ADDIS 6246 —

MESSAGE DELIVERED TO PRESIDENCY 1500 HOURS GMT 23 OCT.
GP-3. PARKER

HANDLE AS LIMDIS PER SSO.

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10-24-68

MICROFILMED BY DS 77

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Authority: VND954503
By: MWA Date: 10/5/05

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MilRep
Summary
Task Force

Principals

ES 2
S 4
U 1
M 2
G
SIG ✓ 1
S/AH 3 ✓ 3
S/AL
SA
S/CPR
S/GOV
S/IL
S/P ✓ 1
S/R ✓ 1
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Geographic

AF5 XS
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EA 11
EUR 10
NEA 8

Functional

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OTHER AGENCIES

WH 10
CIA
DOD
USIA 4
NSA

Other

ACDA 5
AID/EXSEC 3
AA/AFR 2
AA/VN 2
AA/EA 3
AA/NESA 2

PC
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AGR 3
COM 2
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By: MNA Date: 10/5/05



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 NIAMEY 02766 241314Z

46

ACTION SS 70

INFO /070 W

041116

PIR 240900Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
TO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 2372
AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E I C R E T NIAMEY 2766

LIMIDIS

SUBJ: NIGERIA

REF: PARIS 22815 AND ADDIS ABABA 6246

1. ADDIS REFTEL MESSAGE DELIVERED DIORI UPON RETURN
FROM FRANCE 0400 THURSDAY OCTOBER 24.

2. HE CONFIRMED RECEIPT IN FRANCE OF PREVIOUS
MESSAGES CONTAINED ADDIS 6168.
GP-3 ERDOS

MICROFILMED BY RS/R

SECRET

*10-24-68
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*POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
XR POL 27-9 BIAFRA-NIGERIA*

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Geographic

Other

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S/S-Screener 3
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S/S-O DIR
MilRep
Summary
Task Force

AF5 X 5
ARA 9
EA 11
EUR 10
NEA 8

ACDA 5
AID/EXSEC 3
AA/AFR 2
AA/VN 2
AA/EA 3
AA/NESA 2

Functional

Principals

ES 2 ✓ 4
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M 2
G

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INR 6 ✓ 6
IO 4 ✓ 4
L 2
O 3

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VP ✓

SIG ✓ 1
S/AH 3 ✓ 3
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S/P ✓ 1
S/R ✓ 1
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OTHER AGENCIES

WH 10 ✓ 10
CIA ✓ 1
DOD
USIA 4
NSA

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Authority VMD 954503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, SAH 02, AID 28, ACDA 16, PC 04,

RSE 01, /155 W

046555

R 241615Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3242
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION BERLIN
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 889

RECEIVED BY 15/8

UNCLAS LAGOS 13885

USIA FOR IBS

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN PRESS ROUNDUP OCTOBER 24

1. (TIMES) EDITORIAL QTE: WHEN DAY OF RECKONING COMES...
UNQTE, CITING RECENT BBC REPORT THAT WEST GERMANY AND
FRANCE CURRENTLY SEDNING ARMS TO BIAFRA THOROUGH GABON,
ACCUSES WEST GERMANY OF QTE COLLUSION WITH FRANCE
(IN) SOME NEO-COLONIALIST DESIGN TO DISRUPT PEACE OF
AFRICA BY PROLONGING NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR. UNQTE STATES
THAT QTE OF ALL WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FRG HAD THE
NEXT FRIENDLY CO-OPERATION WITH NIGERIA UNQTE

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Authority: VND 954503
By: MVA/RA Date: 10/5/05



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PAGE 02 LAGOS 13885 250846Z.

WHICH MAKES GERMAN ACTIONS MOST DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND, PARTICULARLY SINCE OBSERVERS TEAM HAS DISPROVED GENOCIDE ALLEGATIONS AND QTE RELIGIOUS SLANT... IS DISCREDITED PUBLICITY GIMMICK WHICH EVEN REBEL PIRATE RADIO NO LONGER CARES TO USE. UNQTE SAYS FMG WILL SURELY DEFEAT REBELS AND ASSORTMENT OF MERCENARIES AND NEO-COLONIALIST TROOPS NOW AIDING THEM. QTE THEN DAY OF RECKONING SHALL COME FOR NIGERIA'S FRIENDS AND FOES ALIKE. UNQTE

2. (TRIBUNE) REPORTS REBELS CONSTRUCTING NEW AIRSTRIP AT UGA, TEN MILES NORTH OF ORLU USING QTE ALUMINIUM SHEETING UNQTE AIRLIFTED INTO REBEL AREAS. ALSO REPORTS RECAPTURE OF OGUTA BY FMG FORCES. (SKETCH) REPORTS REBELS BUILDING ANOTHER AIRSTRIP NEAR UMUHIA, SUPPOSEDLY CODE-NAMED DARKNESS.

3. ALL PAPERS REPORT ON OBSERVERS THIRD REPORT ISSUED OCT 23 (LAGOS 13833).


4. (POST, TIMES AND SKETCH) REPORT PM TRUDEAU'S STATEMENTS THAT CANADA DOES NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED IN NIGERIA AS US GOT INVOLVED IN VIETNAM. ALSO REPORT TESTIMONY OF CANADIAN OBSERVER GENERAL MILROY BEFORE CANADIAN PARLIAMENT'S EXTERNAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE THAT GENOCIDE NOT PRACTICED BY FMG TROOPS.

5. (TRIBUNE) CARRIES LONG SIGNED ARTICLE ATTACKING ITALIAN JOURNALISTS FOR BACKING REBELS. CHARGES THAT ITALIAN JOURNALISTS LET IT BE KNOWN THEY COULD BE BRIBED AND OBVIOUSLY ARE ACTUALLY BEING PAID BY QTE FACELESS ITALIAN BUSINESSMEN UNQTE TO SUPPORT REBELS. POINTS OUT NUMBERS OF ITALIAN CONTRACTORS IN NIGERIA WHO QTE STAND TO LOOSE A LOT UNQTE IF FMG RETALIATES BY ADOPTING QTE EQUALLY HOSTILE ATTITUDE TOWARD GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF ITALY. UNQTE

MATHEWS.

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0970



OPERATIONAL ACTION 922 AF5			DEPARTMENT OF STATE <h1 style="text-align: center;">AIRGRAM</h1>			21N 7 XR POL 27 BIAFRA- FORM USE ONLY NIFERA		
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ARA	EUR	FE	TO : Department of State					
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E	S/R	ID	FROM : Amembassy LAGOS					
L	ORM	AID	DATE: October 24, 1968					
C/PM	U.SUN	S/S	SUBJECT: Proposed Reorganization of Nigerian Observer Group					
AGR	4	FRB	REF : Lagos 13833, 13194; Lagos A-884, Oct 16, 1968					
INT	LAB	TAR						
TR	XMB	AIR						
ARMY	CIA	NAVY						
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Enclosed is the text of a paper prepared by the Observer Group which makes certain proposals for the reorganization of the Group. Basically, these are: stationing permanent observers in the area of responsibility of each of the three FMG divisions; additional staff for the permanent observers; additional transport and communications facilities for the entire Observer Group. Qualifications for additional personnel are broadly outlined.

We understand from British official sources that at first the Polish member of the Group was unwilling to discuss any changes in the Group's organization, giving the impression he was under instructions to go along with anything the FMG wanted. He was eventually persuaded to agree to the proposals on the basis that they had to be discussed first with the FMG, and would become operative only if the FMG wanted them.

MATHEWS *sm*

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 62 DS-323

Drafted by: POL:FPicard:mjr 10/24/68

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:EERamsaur Jr *sm*

Clearances:

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0971

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 Authority: VIND 959503
 By: MN NARA Date: 10/5/05

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ACTION				AIRGRAM		POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA	
EUR-6				Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files.		FILE DESIGNATION	
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L	FBO	AID		INFO : LAGOS, LONDON, USUN		OCT 25 11 56 AM 1968	
5/P				FROM : Amembassy ROME		DATE: October 24, 1968	
AGR	COM	FRB	INT	SUBJECT : Parliamentary Debate on Nigeria			
LAB	TAR	TR	XMB	REF : Embtel 8562			
AIR	ARMY	NAVY	DSD	<p>Following Foreign Minister Medici's presentation on Nigeria in the Senate on September 25 (reftel), the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Franco Malfatti, dealt with the question in the Chamber on October 8.</p> <p>The debate in the lower house centered on numerous Parliamentary interpretations presented by all parties calling, in general, for a more active Italian policy toward Nigeria and Biafra. In his effort to stick as closely as possible to the humanitarian and non-involvement line laid down by the Foreign Minister, a line that was faithfully reproduced in the briefing papers prepared by the working level of the Foreign Ministry, Malfatti managed to satisfy only the governing Christian Democratic party. All others, from the ultra-left PSIUP to the far-right neo-Fascists, declared themselves dissatisfied with his remarks and renewed their demands for an Italian political intervention in some form.</p> <p>In the Chamber on October 8, Malfatti said the Government shared the world's consternation and horror at the events in Nigeria. He noted that U.N. intervention would probably be improper because of the internal nature of the problem, as had been recognized by other states and international organizations. For this reason, the Italian government had limited itself to more discreet activities, for example, through the Red Cross and via the OAU. It had also made known its desire to be kept informed of the conclusions reached by the U.N. observers in Nigeria. Malfatti said that the most effective form of activity that the Italian government could undertake was in the humanitarian field, and he referred to the Foreign Minister's description of financial assistance offered through the International Red</p>			
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Drafted by:				For Department Use Only			
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Clearances:				Drafting Date: 10/22/68 Phone No.: 136 Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:SRGammor			

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Cross and UNICEF. He informed the Chamber that at least one Italian medical team would shortly be despatched to Nigeria, and he reported that the government had also approached the Nigerian government asking that obstacles in the way of foreign humanitarian assistance be removed. Finally, he said the Italian government had associated itself with Red Cross protests at the recent killing of various Red Cross representatives in Nigeria.

As mentioned above, most party representatives criticized what they described as a policy of passivity. Moreover, while the official Democratic Christian spokesman accepted the government's reply, another DC spokesman on the party's left flank urged that Italy take the problem to the U.N. This desire was incorporated in a new motion presented on October 15 and signed by 73 of the party's 266 Deputies in the Chamber. This motion, which will ultimately have to be voted on, calls on the government to propose in the U.N. that that body intervene in Nigeria.

According to a Foreign Ministry source, the government hopes to be able to postpone debate and vote on this motion until the latter part of November when, perhaps, the Nigerian situation may be clearer.

While Italian parties seem united in their call for a more active government policy, their reasons for doing so are diverse and, in some cases, contradictory. Though not a mirror of Vatican attitudes, the governing DC party shares its concern at what it sees as the persecution of a Christian minority. The Communist call for an internationalization of the problem is probably seen as a device to attack the French, British and Portuguese governments for their involvement in Biafra and to imply Italian complicity in it. The neo-Fascists on the far right use the issue to criticize the Italian government.

It is not possible at this time to predict the final Italian position. The working level of the Foreign Ministry would like very much to keep out of the problem; that is, to limit Italian activity to the humanitarian field. It is possible, however, that at the policy level or in the government the attitudes of the political parties and the most recent motion of the 73 DC Deputies may force it to favor discussion of the matter in the U.N. General Assembly.

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Date	10/5/05

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 065

PAGE 01 KINSHA 12320 231415Z

53

ACTION AF 16

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SA 01, AID 28, RSR 01, 116 W
034450

O P 231355Z OCT 68

FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

TO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1371

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

S E C R E T KINSHASA 12320

SUBJECT: NIGERIA

REF: ADDIS 62467

REFTEL MESSAGE FROM HIM TO MOBUTU TRANSMITTED TO ETHIOPIAN
EMBASSY 1300 GMT WEDNESDAY. MCBRIDE

1/ KINSHASA - 12320
10-8368

SECRET

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 13833 231405Z

53:
ACTION: AFI 16

INFO: EUR 15, IO 13, ACDA 16, SA 01, AID 28, PC 04, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04,
SCA 02, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SAH 02, RSR 01, /176 W
034318

P R 231225Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3210
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN
CINCSRIKE/CINCMCAFSA
DIA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LAGOS 13833

SUBJECT: THIRD INTERIM REPORT BY OBSERVER TEAM

REF: LAGOS 13574

1. THIRD REPORT COVERS VISIT OCTOBER 15-18 BY OBSERVER TEAM TO SECOND DIVISION AREA (MID-WESTERN STATE AND ONITSHA BRIDGEHEAD). HALF OF GROUP VISITED ASABA AND ONITSHA; OTHER HALF VISITED IBO AREA WEST OF RIVET NIGER. REPORT SAYS TEAM HAD COMPLETE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND MADE OWN ITINERARIES, BUT BREVITY OF VISIT MAKES CONCLUSIONS TENTATIVE.

2. CONDUCT OF FMG TROOPS SAID BE QTE SATISFACTORY CONSIDERING IT A NEW DIVISION WITH LIMITED MILITARY TRAINING. UNQTE

①
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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 13833 231405Z

3. IN IBO TERRITORY WEST OF NIGER, QTE LIFE HAS RETURNED MORE OR LESS TO NORMAL. UNQTE: THERE QTE PLENTY OF FOOD, INCLUDING MEAT. UNQTE: QTE SCHOOLS AND MARKETS OPERATING. UNQTE: DETAINEES QTE APPEAR TO BE WELL FED AND WELL CARED FOR. UNQTE REPORT NOTES THERE ARE IBOS IN MID-WESTERN STATE GOVERNMENT, AND THAT ARMY, CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AND RED CROSS QTE APPEAR BE COPING ADEQUATELY. UNQTE WITH FEEDING AND ADMINISTERING MEDICAL AID.

4. IN ONITSHA THERE IS EXTENSIVE DAMAGE AND SIGNS OF LOOTING. ONITSHA VIRTUALLY EMPTY EXCEPT FOR APPROX 1,000 CIVILIANS IN CAMP WHERE THEY WELL CARED FOR, ALTHOUGH CAMP IS SHORT OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES.

5. OBSERVERS NOTED THAT IN DPI CAMP AT KWALE, APPROX 150 YOUNG IBO MALES IN CIVIL PRISON, WHICH QTE NOT PROPER PLACE FOR DISPLACED PERSONS, UNQTE AND SUGGESTS THEY BE RETURNED TO HOME AREA NEAR BENIN CITY.

6. OBSERVERS SAID QTE WE DID NOT RPT NOT SEE OR HEAR ANY EVIDENCE OF GENOCIDE. UNQTE

7. OBSERVERS INTEND RETURN TO SECOND DIVISION AREA AT LATER DATE QTE IN ORDER SATISFY THEMSELVES ON CERTAIN MATTERS, UNQTE WHICH UNSPECIFIED.


8. COMMENT: WHILE REPORT GENERALLY FAVORABLE TO FMG, IT DID NOT GENERATE MUCH NEW INFORMATION ON SITUATION IN AREAS VISITED. FULL TEXT FOLLOWS BY AIRGRAM.

9. REPORT TO BE RELEASED 1600 GMT OCT 23.

DECON UPON RECEIPT. MATHEWS

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(11)



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

23

SECRET 968

PAGE 01 MONROV 07807 231306Z

54

ACTION: SS 70

INFO: CIAE 00, SSO 00, /070 W

034030

P 231234Z OCT 68

FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA

TO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC 5393

S E C R E T MONROVIA 7807

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: NIGERIA

REF: ADDIS 6246

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
POL 27-9 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

EMPEROR'S MESSAGE HANDED SEC EMBASSY ATO AREGA TESEMA AT
1224Z OCT 23. BROWN

Monrovia 7807
10-23-68

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SECRET

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Authority	VND959503
By	MM NARA Date 10/5/05

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Principals

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U 2
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SA 3
S/CPR 3
S/GOV 3
S/IL 3
S/P 3
S/R 3
S/FW 3
S/PM 3
M/WP 3
G/PM 3

Geographic

AF5 XS
ARA 9
EA 11
EUR 10
NEA 8

Functional

CU 2
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IGA 2
INR 6 6
IO 4
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OPR 2
OC 2
SY 2
WLG 2
P 2 2
SCA 2
SCS 2
SCI 2

OTHER AGENCIES

WH 10
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DOD 4
USIA 4
NSA 4

Other

ACDA 5
AID/EXSEC 3
AA/AFR 2
AA/VN 2
AA/EA 3
AA/NESA 2
PC 2
VP 2
AEC 3
AGR 3
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EXIM 2
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NASA 2
NIC 2
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By: MVA Date: 10/5/05



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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

SECRET 826

PAGE 01 ADDIS 06246 231011Z

21

ACTION SS: 70

INFO MM 01, SSO 00, /071 W

033206

O 230920Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO AMEMBASSY ACCRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
INFO /AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 367
SECSTATE WASHDC 7415

S E C R E T ADDIS ABABA 6246

LIMDIS

SUBJ: NIGERIA

1. IEG HAS REQUESTED WE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING IDENTICAL MESSAGES FROM HIM TO OTHER OAU CONCOM MEMBERS, DIRECTLY TO DIORI AND AHIDJO AND VIA LOCAL ETHIOPIAN AMBASSADORS TO TUBMAN, MOBUTU AND ANKRAH.

2. FOR PARIS. ACCORDING EARLIER REPORT FROM EMBASSY NIAMEY BIORI EXPECTED RETURN NIGER OCT 23. IF DIORI HAS PROLONGED STAY IN FRANCE REQUEST DELIVER MESSAGE VIA NIGER AMBASSADOR PARIS.

3. TEXT OF MSG FOLLOWS:

QTE: YOUR EXCELLENCY COMMA ONE FOLLOWING EXCHANGES OF CORRESPONDENCE COMMA CONSULTATIONS CARRIED OUT THROUGH ME AND CONTACTS JUST MADE BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY-GEN OF THE OAU WITH THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES IN LAGOS COMMA AND BEARING IN MIND THE EXTREME GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION PREVAILING IN NIGERIA WHERE SEVERAL MILLIONS FIND THEMSELVES CONCENTRATED IN A VERY SMALL AREA ENCIRCLED BY THE FEDERAL FORCES COMMA I HAVE THE HONOUR TO SUGGEST TO YOUR APPRECIATION THE ADVISABILITY OF SENDING TO COLI OUKU COMMA AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH THE LATTER AS WELL

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10-23-68
Addis Ababa 6246

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By: MWA Date: 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ADDIS 06246 231011Z

AS WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COMMA A DELEGATION COMPOSED OF HIGH RANKING REPRESENTATIVES FROM EACH OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT MEMBERS OF THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE STOP

TWO THE TASK OF THIS DELEGATION WILL CONSIST IN CONVINCING COL. OJUKU AND HIS COLLEAGUES OF THE NECESSITY OF BRINGING TO AN END TO THE FRACTRICIDAL CONFLICT IN THE HIGH INTEREST OF THE NIGERIAN PEOPLE AND OF AFRICA BY IMPLEMENTING THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE LAST ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN ALGIERS STOP THIS DELEGATION WILL ALSO HAVE THE ADDITIONAL TASK OF CONFIRMING TO COL. OJUKU AND HIS COLLEAGUES THAT ALL THE GUARANTEES OF SECURITY AND THE STRICT IMPLEMENTATION OF ALGIERS RESOLUTION WOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY THE AUTHORITIES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN LAGOS STOP IF THE EFFORT WHICH I HAVE SUGGESTED ABOVE GIVE POSITIVE RESULTS COMMA I FEEL CERTAIN THAT THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE COULD THEN MEET TO GIVE FINAL CONSIDERATIONS TO THIS TRAGIC CONFLICT STOP

THREE I THINK THAT SUCH AN INITIATIVE ON THE PART OF THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE MAY BE THE LAST CHANCE TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL END TO THE TRAGIC CONFLICT IN NIGERIA STOP

FOUR IF THIS SUGGESTION MEETS WITH YOUR APPROVAL COMMA I WOULD APPRECIATE VERY MUCH RECEIVING MOST URGENTLY YOUR REPLY AND AT THE SAME TIME THE NAME OF YOUR REPRESENTATIVE IN ORDER TO TAKE IMMEDIATELY THE NECESSARY STEPS FOR THE ARRIVAL OF THIS DELEGATION TO UMAHIA STOP


FIVE FINALLY I AM INFORMED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY-GEN THAT THERE IS YET MUCH NEED OF RELIEF SUPPLIES TO THE VICTIMS OF THE CONFLICT AND THAT IN ORDER TO REMEDY THIS SITUATION APPEAL SHOULD BE MADE TO MEMBERS OF THE OAU TO MAKE DONATIONS THROUGH THE NIGERIAN RED CROSS SOCIETY STOP IF THIS MEETS YOUR EXCELLENCY'S APPROVAL I SHALL DIRECT THE ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY-GEN TO ISSUE AN APPEAL IN THE NAME OF THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE STOP

PLEASE ACCEPT COMMA YOUR EXCELLENCY THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION STOP YOUR GOOD FRIEND HAILE SELASSIE I COMMA EMPEROR UNQTE

4. CONFIRM TRANSMITTAL. HALL

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MilRep
Summary ✓
Task Force

AF5 XS
ARA 9
EA 11
EUR 9
NEA 8

ACDA 5
AID/EXSEC 3
AA/AFR2
AA/VN 2
AA/EA 3
AA/NEA 2

Functional

Principals

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IO 4 ✓
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SIG ✓
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S/AL ✓
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AGR 3
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OTHER AGENCIES

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WH 10 ✓
CIA ✓
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USIA 4
NSA

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Pol 3 OAU
XR Pol 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 113

PAGE 01 PARIS 22815 231437Z

46

ACTION SS 70

INFO /070 W

034631

P. 231245Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7348
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY

S E C R E T PARIS 22815

LIMDIS

SUBJ: OAU AND NIGERIA

REF: ADDIS ABABA 6246

CHARGE OF NIGER EMBASSY INFORMED MORNING OCT. 23 THAT THERE IS
SECOND MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT DIORI FROM HIM. IN VIEW OF FACT THAT
DIORI RETURNING TO NIAMEY EVENING OCT. 23 IT WAS AGREED THAT MES-
SAGE SHOULD BE DELIVERED THERE. CHARGE WILL ALERT DIORI. SHRIVER

PARIS-22815
10-23-68

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
X^R DEF 19-8 FR-BIAFRA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**
23

CONFIDENTIAL 474

PAGE 01 LAGOS 13844 231848Z

42
ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, GPM 04, NSC 10, SPI 02, SS 25, RSC 01, L 03, INR 07,

CIAE 00, NSA 02, DODE 00, AID 28, NIC 01, RSR 01, /128 W
036103

R 231442Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3218
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION USUN NY
AMCONSUL KADUNA
AMCONSUL IBADAN

BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L LAGOS 13844

FOLLOWING IS EXERPT OF TELEGRAM PASSED TO EMBASSY
BY BRITISH HICOM LAGOS (PROTECT) TAKEN FROM MESSAGE:
RECEIVED FROM BRITISH HICOM OTTAWA OCTOBER 19:
QTE MR. SHARP IS STILL FINDING MORE OF HIS TIME TAKEN
UP WITH NIGERIA THAN ANY OTHER SUBJECT. HE TOLD ME
WHEN I SAW HIM ON 17 OCTOBER THAT HE WISHED WAR
COULD BE FINISHED. OJUKWU WAS REALLY DANGEROUS MAN.
IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION ABOUT EXTENT OF FRENCH AID
HE SAID THE CANADIANS KNEW OF A FRENCH DEPOSIT OF
TWELVE MILLION DOLLARS IN OJUKWU'S FAVOR IN A MOROCCAN
BANK UNQTE GP-1 MATHEWS

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10-23-68

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
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PAGE 01 LONDON 13758 231731Z

53
ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,

P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SA 01, AID 28, IO 13, ACDA 16,

RSR 01, /160 W

035585

P R 231704Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6829
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS

SECRET LONDON 13758

NOFORN

SUBJ: NIGERIA: QUAKER PEACE INITIATIVE

ARNOLD SMITH OF COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT INFORMS US THAT QUAKER REPS VOLKMAR AND MARTIN, WHO UNDERTOOK PEACE FEELER TO BIAFRA WITH FMG CONSENT, HAVE RETURNED TO LAGOS. SMITH DID NOT KNOW FULL RESULTS OF THEIR MISSION BUT UNDERSTOOD THEY HAD RECEIVED REBUFF FROM OJUKWU. SMITH WAS HOPEFUL THAT VOLKMAR AND MARTIN MIGHT BE COMING TO LONDON AFTER REPORTING TO FMG.

2. SMITH SAID COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT NOT ACTIVE ON NIGERIA PEACE FRONT AT PRESENT BUT WAS ENDEAVORING TO KEEP ABREAST OF DEVELOPMENTS. TOWARD THIS END HE WAS TRYING TO SEE BIAFRA REP KOGBARA WHO HE UNDERSTOOD HAD JUST RETURNED TO LONDON AFTER QUICK TRIP HOME TO SEE OJUKWU. BRUCE

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LONDON-13758
10-23-68

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Classification

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259898
XR POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
t of State

22 OCT 68 23 47

Origins

ACTION: Amembassy MONROVIA

Info:

INFO: Amembassy ADDIS ABABA

" LAGOS
" LISBON
" LONDON
" MADRID
" PARIS

USUN NY
Amembassy PRETORIA (FOR PALMER)

STATE

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: Liberian discussion with Secretary on Nigeria:
and other international matters

~~XX~~
~~Based upon unclassified Memcon subject to revision upon review.~~

XX1. In 50-minute meeting October 21 Secretary Grimes of Liberia had his annual friendly discussion with Secretary. Initial subject was Nigeria. Grimes explained that OAU states had expressed themselves overwhelmingly against Biafran secession but at ~~the~~ same time wanted negotiated settlement to take Ibo fears into account. Some activity in formative stage within Consultative Committee of OAU might mean Committee would meet in Monrovia to discuss what steps it might take. Secretary hoped it would be possible to induce both sides in conflict to negotiate in spirit of magnanimity. He could understand how those most hard pressed

Drafted by:

AF/W:RMMelbourne:vcs:10/22/68

Tel. Ext.
2619

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: **AF: Ambassador Moore**

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Brown

S-JPMoffat

RECEIVED BY: 10/10/70

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Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

0985

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Authority: VND 459/30
By: MN NARA Date: 10/5/0



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 758

PAGE 01 LAGOS 13818 230846Z

14
ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SAH 02, AID 28, SR 01,
ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 02, RSR 01, / 157 W

032779

R 221630Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3202
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L LAGOS 13818

SUBJ: POSSIBILITY OF RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS WITH NIGERIAN REBELS.

REF: KADUNA 1470 (NOTAL) *Pol 15-1 Nigeria*
TR Pol 27 Biafra Nigeria

1. BBC AFRICAN SERVICE TODAY FEATURED STORY FROM ITS VETERAN
CORRESPONDENT HERE, ANGUS MCDERMID, TO EFFECT THAT IT POSSIBLE
PEACE TALKS WITH REBELS WILL BE RESUMED SHORTLY.

2. IN CONVERSATION WITH EMOFF TODAY, MCDERMID MADE FOLLOWING
POINTS:

A. HE WOULD NOT REVEAL HIS SOURCE FOR STORY ON PEACE TALKS,
OTHER THAN SAYING THEY QTE HIGHLY PLACED. UNQTE (HE DOES HAVE
GOOD CONNECTIONS WITH MANY TOP FIGURES IN FMG.)

1

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By: MWA/ARA Date: 10/5/05



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TELEGRAM

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B. ALSO SAID IT HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT INFO COMMISSIONER ENAHORO'S CURRENT NORTHERN TOUR DESIGNED PRIMARILY PREPARE NORTHERNERS FOR RESUMPTION OF TALKS. MCDERMID OPINED TRANSPORT COMMISSIONER TARKA AND WORKS COMMISSIONER OKUNNU ALSO IN NORTH AND MIDDLE BELT FOR SAME REASON.

C. MCDERMID THINKS THAT AMONG REASONS FMG TAKING INITIATIVE FOR RESUMED TALKS IS DIFFICULTY FEDERAL TROOPS MIGHT HAVE MOVING INTO LAST BASTION REBEL-HELD TERRITORY, ESPECIALLY SINCE BIAFRANS HAVE INCREASED FIREPOWER LATELY AS RESULT FRENCH AID. HE SAYS COMMANDERS IN FIELD (HE ACCOMPANIED MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP ON LATEST TRIP) TELL HIM INCREASE IN REBEL FIREPOWER IS QTE NOTICEABLE. UNQTE.

D. MCDERMID HAS DEFINITE IMPRESSION, PRESUMABLY FROM HIS QTE HIGHLY PLACED UNQTE FMG SOURCES, THAT FEDERALS PREFER ANY MOVE TO RESUME TALKS BE THROUGH OAU.

3. COMMENT: WHILE WE CANNOT ADDUCE ANY HARD OR CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE TO BACK UP THIS STORY, IT IS PLAUSIBLE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

GP-3

MATHEWS

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By	MW:ARA Date 10/5/05



Pal 27 Biafra - Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

43

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CONFIDENTIAL: 757

PAGE 01 USUN N 07253 220120Z

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ACTION 10 15

INFO EUR 15, SA 01, SAH 02, AF 10, ORM 03, SR 01, AID 28, ACDA 16, SCS 04,

SCA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, NSA 02, RSR 01, /170 W
----- 024379

R 220010Z OCT 68
FM USMISSION USUN NEWYORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4008
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY ADIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 7253

NIGERIA

REF: USUN 7229

UNDERSTAND FROM WEIDMAN (CANADA) KENYANS HAVE APPROACHED
NIGERIANS RE FONMIN MTG. NIGERIANS REPORTED NOT TO BE
OPPOSED TO IDEA. WEIDMAN ALSO SAID KENYANS STARTING
CONTACTS WITH VARIOUS AF DELS RE MTG. ESSENTIAL ADDRESSEES
DO NOT REVEAL SOURCE OF INFO OR DISCUSS WITH OTHER PERSONS.

GP-3

WIGGINS

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Authority: VND 959503
By: MN/ARA Date: 10/5/05

AF/CW:WS Clarke:km 10/24/68

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(Drafting Office and Officer)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

14344

APPROVED IN S
10/30/68

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 22, 1968
10:30 a.m.
Secretary's Office

SUBJECT: Nigeria (PART I of II)

PARTICIPANTS: His Excellency Dr. Daouda Badarou, Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Dahomey
His Excellency Maxime-Leopold Zollner, Ambassador of the
Republic of Dahomey
Mr. Virgile-Octave Tevoedjre, Minister-Counselor of the
Embassy of the Republic of Dahomey

XCOMESXOK

The Secretary
The Honorable Clinton E. Knox, American Ambassador to Dahomey
Mr. William E. Schaufele, Jr., Country Director, AF/CW
Mr. Walter S. Clarke, Country Officer, Dahomey Affairs, AF/CW

COPIES TO: S/S. G. WH. AF-3, Amembassies: COTONOU.
S/P. INR/OD. CIA. LAGOS.

Following opening salutation welcoming Foreign Minister Badarou to the United States, where he has been attending the General Assembly meetings, the Secretary noted the profound concern of the United States regarding the continuing hostilities in Nigeria. He asked the Foreign Minister how the conflict was viewed in Dahomey.

The Foreign Minister replied that his government was opposed to the division of Nigeria, noting that "every country has its own Biafra." Badarou pointed out that there are strong ethnic and economic ties with neighboring Nigeria, and that his President has offered to act as mediator in the dispute. The GRD, he stated, remains ready to answer any call from the FMG. He did mention that in Dahomey there are strong humanitarian feelings for the victims of the war zone.

FORM DS-1254
8-61

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BY S/S: CMS

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GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

POL 7 DAHOMEY

UN 22.2 GA
POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

0989

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Authority: VND 959503
By: MNA Date: 10/3/05

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POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

258818
21 OCT 68 20 02z
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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS

Info:

INFO: Amembassy LONDON
PARIS.
PRETORIA
US Mission GENEVA
USUN NY
CINCSTRIKE
Amconsul IBADAN
Amconsul KADUNA

PRETORIA FOR PALMER

SUBJECT: Nigeria Press Summary - Oct. 21

1. Last press summary Oct 16.
2. NYTimes Oct 20 carries Fellows article from Lagos headed some Ibos suffer at Biafran hands - they and minority tribes not enthusiastic for war. Ibo lady in Onitsha interviewed, said she never favored idea Biafran secession, feared war would come and like many Onitsha Ibos knew instinctively it would interrupt prosperity this once busy market town. Result was Onitsha Ibos not in good books of others, called saboteurs by other Ibos. Onitsha people were not enthusiastic about war, nor were Ibos west of Niger river who never part of Biafra but suffered as much as if they had been. When Biafrans after brief occupation began withdrawing last fall they commanded all vehicles, emptied markets of food. Those who resisted shot on spot and Biafran troops left behind them bodies of hundreds of market women sprawled in front of their stalls. When FMG

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Drafted by: AF/P:RLPerkins:mb 10/21/68

Tel. Ext. 2105

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Nigerian Task Force: Mr. Melbourne

Clearances:

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

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Authority: VND954503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/03

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

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troops arrived in Benin, non-Ibos dragged Ibos before soldiers denouncing them as collaborators and spies, insisting they be shot. Often soldiers would oblige, and if not non-Ibo civilians would hack captive Ibos to death themselves. Pattern repeated Asaba when FMG troops arrived, and although no one will ever know full extent massacres, missionaries and businessmen reckon 8,000 Ibos slaughtered in those two towns alone. They had not been Biafrans. Probably most denounced and dragged away to execution for no better reason than that someone wanted their property and tribal passions of mobs aroused. To west of these Ibos, Bini, Yoruba and other tribesmen caught in path Biafrans' ill-fated march on Lagos suffered at hands of Biafrans. In Biafra non-Ibos suffered most: Ogoja to east who were included in Biafra because they always provided bulk food for Iboland; Efiks, Ibibios, Ekois, Ijaws and others to south and through swampy coastal areas who drawn into Biafra because their territories held oil and seaports needed by Biafra for access to outside world. There were 7-8 million Ibos in Biafra along with 5-6 million non-Ibos who had never felt at ease with aggressive, beater educated neighbors. So far most of war fought on ground these outsiders, who may have suffered heaviest casualties and going most often without food. FMG aware before war most these minority tribes wanted no part secession and counted on them making enough problems for Biafrans to make war a brief one. Did not work that way. Ibo and non-Ibo villages alike bombed and strafed indiscriminately by Egyptians flying for Nigeria AF, and non-Ibos turned up hating and fearing both sides. Refugees from minority tribes have had hard time in Ikot Ekpene under both Biafran

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8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

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Authority VND 959503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

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
and Nigerian rule.

2. Garrison reports in Times from Paris that Thant warned on Biafra deaths. Report was by Dr. Herman Middlekoop, head of WCC relief program in Biafra, Dutchman who has worked in Biafra for more than decade and currently stationed Queen Elizabeth Hospital at Umuahia. According his message to UNSYG, estimated death from starvation in July was 6,000 daily, August 10,000 daily, September 12,000 daily. Unless immediate cease fire would expect 25,000 daily for December. Answer does not lie with relief organization; it lies with end of war. Catholic and UNICEF officials generally support Middlekoop's findings. Projection his daily death figures into monthly totals produces this breakdown: July 186,000 dead, August 310,000, September 360,000. Death toll for three months ending September is 856,000. As indicated his report and confirmed other relief sources, toll began leveling off October with perhaps slight reduction death rate due to average 20 flights nightly from Gabon and off shore islands. But even if October toll reduced to 200,000, toll since July would top one million. Like Middlekoop many working in Caritas and WCC believe only UN presence can bring about cease fire, permitting relief enter Biafra on unhindered and massive scale. But Thant has repeatedly rejected UN role on grounds civil war an internal affair and legally UN is powerless intervene.

3. Fellows in news of week in review roundup says on western front where Nigerian army has not been able move for months civilian refugees seem for most part in good health and fairly well fed. In north relief operations started by army, Red Cross and missionaries are well organized and although not enough doctors refugees at least being fed. In south where fighting has

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been worst in recent weeks and shifting battle zones most hectic, refugees in worst shape. More than half these innocent civilian victims when finally reached seem just on margin starvation, especially women and children. A million dislocated refugees being fed by army and various relief agencies. Reckoning now that if war should end quickly number in need food and medical attention might leap suddenly to three and half million. This a frightening prospect for relief workers. And there genuine fear fighting could drag on for many months more. Proportions disaster to civilian population would then be immensely greater.


4. Times also reports from Ottawa Canadian Post Offices notified not to accept Biafran stamps on letters, but to treat them as invalid and tax addressee for double the postage deficiency. ✓

5. ~~Sund~~ Sunday Wash Star reported outdoor demonstration scheduled Catholic University and mass in support Biafra to begin week activity ending next Saturday with rally at Lincoln Memorial.

6. Wash Post Oct 16 carries Astrachan story from Aba headed Biafrans slow final federal offensive. Story dated 19th and marked delayed. Visit to front shows end of war still long way off. Aba taken by feds Sept 4. Six weeks later front is four miles from center town on main road north to Umuahia and four miles east on main road to Ikot Ekpene. On one bush trail fed troops have pushed about 12 miles toward Umuahia. Reasons for slow progress are: (1) increased Biafran resistance. As rebel territory shrinks its supply lines shortened, fronts can be more thickly manned,

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esprit de corps intensifies. And arms supplies have increased since September with about 21 tons nightly from Libreville alone and more from Abidjan and Sao Tome, ranging from small arms ammo to antitank weapons.

(2) Nigerian supply problems. Despite overall FMG superiority in equipment, manpower, neither arms nor men reaching front quickly enough in right amounts and quality. Many observers consider it remarkable supply lines function as well as they do, given lack experience, money and air transport.

(3) West African style of fighting. In this hot humid climate in culture that puts low value on conspicuous outpourings energy, people do not fight in style Vietnam, Korea or World War II. For example, Nigerian peasant reluctant convert modern agricultural methods which require more energy because he does not believe marginal increase will be as great as experts predict or great enough justify added effort. And perhaps because even if it is he not sure what he will do with added profits. This attitude carried over into urban life makes some strangers think people here lazy. They are not when sufficiently educated and motivated. Nigerian army combines both positive and negative aspects traditional feelings on work with local common sense about hot sun and dangers night fighting, and usually stops work around tea time. So do Biafrans. Day at front shows all these factors at work.

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FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

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Authority VND954503
By MVA Date 10/5/03

ORIGIN/ACTION

AF-5

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 27 BIAFRA -
NIGERIA

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A-235

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TO : Department of State

DEPT (PASS) LAGOS, LONDON, PARIS, ABIDJAN, LUSAKA, DAPH, BSAALAM

FROM : Amembassy LIBREVILLE

SUBJECT : BIAFRA - Gabonese Foreign Minister Explains Country's Position
Vis-a-Vis Biafra at OAU Meeting in Algiers (September 4-13, 1968)

REF : -

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 25 4 34 PM '68

RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH

DATE: October 21, 1968

During the course of the Fifth Meeting of the OAU Assembly of Chiefs of States held last month in Algiers, Gabon's Foreign Minister--and delegate at the meeting--Jean Remy AYOUNE, outlined his country's position with respect to the Nigerian-Biafran conflict in an address directed to the attending delegates. This address, which we have not had from any other source, was recently published in the Gabonese daily information bulletin Gabon-Matin. Below is an informal translation of the salient portions of Minister Ayoun's speech:

"Gabon's official recognition of the Biafran State was not some spectacular gesture designed to draw world attention upon itself, as many have so insinuated. Rather, this act has a true end in mind, for it tends to bring to a close the tragedy which has been taking place in Nigeria for more than fourteen months, this massive destruction of human lives which spares neither young or old nor the women, this obviously deliberate extermination of a people numbering ten million individuals. The information which reached us from this brother-country was so distressing that we believed an appeal to the universal conscience was necessary to break the silence of the wide-spread indifference which surrounded, at that time, the genocide which seemed to be allowed to run free-rein.

"All the countries represented at this distinguished assembly have themselves deeply desired an end to this drama, one which appears as a hideous wound in the flank of Africa and a misfortune for our entire continent. At a time when all Africa is about to render its judgment on this delicate question, Gabon ought to define clearly its position.

"By supporting Biafra and engaging in this painful debate, Gabon assumes the position of defending human rights. Here we find ourselves surrounded

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FORM 4:62 DS-323

Drafted by: ECON:LBender:ljh 21Oct68

Contents and Classification Approved by:

DMBane, Amb

Clearances:

HF Nelson, DCM

1700 OCT 25 PM 5 23

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Libreville A-235

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by many highly demanding considerations: On the one hand, we wish to respect the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States and to respect their territorial integrity, two imperatives equally vital to all countries. But, on the other hand, we must also defend man's inalienable right to live and an individual's or a people's right to order their own lives--in other words, the right to self-determination.

"Our organization cannot favor merely one of these positions; it must defend them both simultaneously. This means that its duty becomes that of reconciling differences and striving for an equitable compromise between the positions of the contesting parties. Such is the task of our organization--it must be resolved or the organization itself declared a failure.

"In seeking this compromise, above all one important element must be considered. This is the human element in the sense that between the parties one is obviously materially stronger than the other, and the moral tradition of nations and humanity pressures the strongest to be prepared to make more sacrifices.

"In short, in seeking this compromise, we believe the notion of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States and that of secession should be reconsidered. In fact, one must always stop to determine the motive which originates an intervention or the cause of a secession. I can give two examples of this taken from our African life-- When a neighbor's house is on fire in the village, one has the obligation to aid in its extinction. At the same time, however, when a fight breaks out, one must also put himself between the antagonists. The police does precisely this in a place where a force of order exists. We believe, therefore, that all the member States of the Organization of African Unity form a community within which it is not permitted to remain unmoved or indifferent in the face of a calamity of which a member State is victim. These examples are equally intervention in the internal affairs of others.

"In the case of secession, we believe that it is necessary to determine the fundamental cause leading to such an act. In this manner, one avoids the possibility of encouraging the mere wreaking of vengeance or tribal animosities when one group attempts to exterminate, entirely eliminate, another ethnic grouping, which is followed by attempts to justify, in full view of the entire world, what is tantamount to genocide within a multi-ethnic State under the pretext of preventing a secession. Everyone should recognize that, in our States, the ethnic minorities lack sufficient protection."

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COMMENT: Minister Ayoune's statement reveals nothing new since it merely restates Gabon's justification for its recognition and aid to Biafra behind

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By	MN NARA Date 10/5/05

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-3

the facade of "humanitarian" considerations. The examples drawn from African life to illustrate the validity of the Gabonese position, while colorful, are hardly analogous with the Biafran situation. Moreover, the "brotherhood" concept loses much of its force when one considers the true relationship between the Gabonese and the Biafran peoples--they really have little in common. In fact, had it not been for French pressures, the Gabonese would most probably be seeing the Biafran's plight in completely different light--and it is unlikely that "humanitarian considerations" would have caused that light to flicker.

1968 OCT 20 14 10 32

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By	MW NARA Date 10/5/05

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

AID(CAN) NIGERIA
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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

RECEIVED
 DEPT. OF STATE

INFO: GENEVA, LAGOS

OCT 23 11 05 AM 1968

ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy OTTAWA

DATE: October 21, 1968

SUBJECT: Canadian Relief Supplies for Nigeria

REF :

During the House of Commons session of October 16, the Minister for External Affairs, Mitchell SHARP, tabled written replies to five questions on Canadian relief supplies for Nigeria. The five questions were asked, in written form, by Andrew BREWIN, chief defense and foreign policy critic of the New Democratic Party (NDP). The questions and answers are as follows:

1. QUESTION: What proportion of the allocation of \$500,000 announced by the Prime Minister on July 31, 1968 for the provision of emergency supplies from Canada for relief of the area of Nigeria affected by hostilities has been expended?

ANSWER: Approximately \$50,000 has been disbursed. (See also answer to question 4 below regarding expenditure commitments.)

2. QUESTION: What supplies have in fact been sent to Nigeria?

ANSWER: Drugs, vaccines, antibiotics and dried salted codfish have been sent.

3. QUESTION: What portion of such supplies has been actually used in the area affected by the hostilities for the relief of the victims?

ANSWER: All the supplies have been used.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by
 POL:GBChristianson:mco 10/18/68

Contents and Classification Approved by:
 POL:WMJohnson

Clearances:

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 Authority: VMD 954503
 By: MWA Date: 10/5/05

1968 OCT 23 PM 12 15

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from Ottawa
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4. QUESTION: Is it contemplated that further allocations will be made?

ANSWER: An additional allocation of \$500,000 was announced by the Prime Minister on September 17. \$875,000 has been committed to orders for additional shipments of fish and \$75,000 for freight and wharfage charges.

5. QUESTION: What steps have been taken by the Canadian Government to remove obstacles to adequate distribution of Canadian and other supplies to the victims of the Nigerian hostilities?

ANSWER: The Canadian government has supported the efforts of the international committee of the Red Cross to arrange for delivery corridors into the areas of greatest need from outside distribution points. This support has included diplomatic interventions with the federal Nigerian government and public appeals to the Biafran authorities, with whom Canada has no official relations.

(Whe)
LINDER

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By	MNARA Date 10/5/05



Pol 27 Biafra-Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**
32

CONFIDENTIAL 893

PAGE: 01 USUN: NI 07229 211411Z

51
ACTION: IO: 15

INFO: AF: 10, EUR: 15, ACDA: 16, SR: 01, ORM: 03, SCS: 04, SCA: 02, AID: 28, SAH: 02,

SA: 01, CIAE: 00, DODE: 00, GPM: 04, H: 02, INR: 07, LI: 03, NSAE: 00, NSC: 10,

PI: 04, RSC: 01, SP: 02, SS: 25, USIA: 12, RSR: 01, 168 W

020425

PI R 211347Z OCT 68
FM: USMISSION: USUN: NY
TO: SECSTATE: WASHDC: PRIORITY 3984
INFO: AMEMBASSY LAGOS:
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
USMISSION: GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

CONFIDENTIAL USUN: 7229

LUSAKA FOR PALMER

SUBJECT: NIGERIA

1. WEIDMAN (CANADA) APPROACHED MISOFF RE: KENYAN PROPOSAL DURING GENERAL DEBATE THAT FONMINS CURRENTLY IN NY MEET TO DISCUSS NIGERIA WITH VIEW OBTAIN (A) CESSATION OF ARMS SHIPMENTS AND (B) CEASE-FIRE. WEIDMAN SAID CANADA THOUGHT IDEA GOOD AND IGNATIEFF (CANADA) HAD EXPRESSED CANADIAN SUPPORT TO KENYAN MINEXTAFF. HE SAID MEETING WOULD INCLUDE ALL FONMINS AND WOULD NOT BE RESTRICTED TO AFS.

2. WEIDMAN SAID CANADA HAD RESERVATIONS RE: POINT (A) BECAUSE IT WAS DEEMED IMPRACTICAL, BUT THOUGHT THAT IF SUCH MTG TOOK PLACE, FONMINS MIGHT BE ABLE NOTE AND SUPPORT QAU RES AND REACH AGREEMENT ON (1) TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF NIGERIA, (2) CEASE-FIRE AND (3) GUARANTEES TO IBOS. WEIDMAN ALSO SAID ANY SUCH MTG WOULD BE PREDICATED ON FMG AND AF AGREEMENT AND WOULD BE OUTSIDE UN CONTEXT.

3. WEIDMAN FURTHER SAID CANADA APPROACHING US AND UK TO SEEK THEIR VIEWS RE FONMIN MTG. HE STRESSED MAIN INITIATIVE TO GETTING MTG OF

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 USUNIN 07229 211411Z

FONMINS UP TO AFS. KENYA WOULD BE TALKING TO OTHER DELS.

COMMENT: IF AFS WERE WILLING TO PUT FORWARD, BELIEVE IDEA IS GOOD AND SHOULD BE GIVEN SERIOUS EXAMINATION. DEPTS VIEWS REQUESTED SOONEST IN VIEW MANY FONMINS MAY BE LEAVING BY END OF OCT AND SUCH MTG WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PLACE DURING COURSE NEXT WEEK. ALSO BELIEVE DEPT SHOULD GIVE FAVORABLE RESPONSE TO US PARTICIPATING IN SUCH A MTG SHOULD IT TAKE PLACE AND US IS INVITED.

GP-3.

WIGGINS

CONFIDENTIAL

1001

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 959503
By	MNARA
Date	10/5/05



Department of State

TELEGRAM

POL 15-1 NIGERIA
XK POL 27 BIAFRA-28
NIGERIA

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 240

PAGE 01 KADUNA 01470 221032Z

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ACTION AF 16

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02,

SS 25, USIA 12, NSA 02, RSR 01, SAH 02, IO 13, EUR 15, AID 28, SR 01,

ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 02, IGA 02, 159 W

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R 211600Z OCT 68
FM AMCONSUL KADUNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 917
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMCONSUL IBADAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE KADUNA 1470

SUBJECT: TONY ENAHORO STATEMENTS

1. IN HALF HOUR TELEVISION INTERVIEW HERE, CHIEF TONY ENAHORO, FID COMMISSIONER FOR INFORMATION, COMMENTED AS FOLLOWS:
A. FAILURE OF KAMPALA, ADDIS TALKS DUE TO LACK OF ANY MIDDLE GROUND FOR COMPROMISE BETWEEN FMG INSISTENCE ON RENUNCIATION OF SECESSION AND REBEL INSISTENCE ON SOVEREIGNTY OF BIAFRA, PLUS

FACT REBEL DELEGATION CARRIED NO WEIGHT AND HAD NO REAL MANDATE TO NEGOTIATE.

B. AMNESTY: GENERAL AMNESTY WILL BE GRANTED CONSISTENT WITH OAU ALGIERS RESOLUTION BUT FMG WOULD HAVE TO INITIATE SPECIAL EXAMINATION OF CASES OF MANY REBEL LEADERS. BUT IT WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL TO HOLD FIVE OR SIX MILLION IBOS RESPONSIBLE FOR REBELLION.

C. RECONSTRUCTION: THIS MUST BE DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS: RECONSTRUCTION, IN REPAIR OF WAR DAMAGE, AND CONSTRUCTION WHICH MUST IN NO CASE BE LIMITED TO WAR STRICKEN AREAS ONLY. SOMETHING MUST BE DONE TO ENABLE IBOS TO SEEK LIVELIHOOD IN THEIR HOME AREA BUT NOT TO DEGREE OF RECREATING IMBALANCE (IN FAVOR OF IBOS)

THAT EXISTED BEFORE WHICH WOULD MERELY SET STAGE FOR ANOTHER UPHEAVAL. COUNTRY CAN IN NO CASE GIVE INGRESSION THROUGH RECONSTRUCTION EMPHASIS IN REBEL AREAS THAT REBELLION PAYS OFF.

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Authority: VND 950503
By: MNARA Date: 10/3/05

ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 27 BIAFRANIGERIA

FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R	REP	AF
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ARA	EUR	FE
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TO : Department of State

DEPT PASS WITH ENCLOSURE: ACCRA, ADDIS ABABA, IBADAN, KADUNA, KINSHASA, LONDON, LAGOS (10), MONROVIA, MOSCOW, NAIROBI, PARIS, YAOUNDE, USMISSION GENEVA, USMISSION USUN NY, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, DEA

FROM : Amembassy LAGOS

DATE: OCT 18 1968

SUBJECT: NIGERIA: Prospects for Termination of the War

REF :

Enclosed is a report on the above subject prepared in conjunction with Secretary Palmer's recent visit to Lagos.

SUMMARY

The war in Nigeria is drawing to a close. It has been prolonged by French activity, but not, we believe, indefinitely.

It is likely that with the termination of hostilities in the formal sense a period of guerrilla or irregular warfare will ensue, but we believe that the natural intelligence of the Ibos will eventually lead them to accept the terms offered by the FMG.

The fact that the Ibos have left large numbers of women, children and old people outside their lines as they retreat suggests that belief in the genocidal intentions of the FMG is not as deep-rooted as has been thought.

MATHEWS

Enclosure:
As stated

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

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☐ In ☐ Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

POL: EERamseur/FPicard:mjr 10/18/68

Contents and Classification Approved by:

DCM: CL Olson

Clearances:

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A-891 from Lagos

Prospects for termination of the war

It now seems clear that the war in Nigeria, at least in the formal sense, is drawing to its conclusion unless the Biafrans receive large-scale assistance from the outside. Indeed, a month ago the Biafrans were close to the end of their tether, but they were temporarily rescued by an infusion of military supplies, primarily through Libreville and unquestionably the result of French activity. Precise French aims and intentions remain a mystery, but we assume that the French will not undertake the overt, large-scale intervention that would be required to turn the tide. Thus the war has been prolonged, but not, we believe, indefinitely.

Given the above situation, what alternatives are open to the Biafrans? It seems to us that they are roughly as follows:

1. Capitulation and acceptance of the terms offered by the FMG.

Comment: The FMG is finally and belatedly addressing itself to the psychological warfare aspects of the conflict, including safe-conduct leaflets, promises of amnesty (presumably not including Ojukwu), and emphasis on the humane treatment given refugees. This alternative is unlikely to be accepted by the Ibos as long as Ojukwu is in the saddle, but Ojukwu could be killed, captured or ousted, or he could set up a government in exile in Libreville or elsewhere. We are inclined to believe that once Ojukwu is off the stage, the natural intelligence of the Ibos would suggest to them that mass suicide is not the answer. We recognize, however, that there are strong differences of opinion on this particular point.

2. Last-gasp offensive with Port Harcourt, Calabar or Benin as most likely objectives.

Comment: The Biafrans could be hoarding the bulk of the arms now being received through Libreville and Abidjan to mount a major offensive to recapture Port Harcourt, Calabar or Benin. They may calculate that success would result in disarray within Nigeria that would seriously impede the FMG's war effort and in increased foreign political support and military assistance. We judge there is an outside chance they could accomplish such an operation.


While it is possible that a Biafran military success of this magnitude would throw Nigeria into disarray, we consider it more likely the military leaders and civil servants who dominate the FMG would seek military materiel and assistance from any source and on almost any terms to continue the struggle. The war would, of course, be considerably prolonged.

3. Guerrilla warfare or activity by irregular troops after the fall of Umuahia and the interdiction of the airstrips.

Comment: Many observers are convinced that long drawn out guerrilla warfare will ensue after the last Ibo strongholds fall. Much depends on

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how deeply rooted the belief is in the genocidal intentions of the FMG. As of this writing, Radio Biafra is still belaboring this point. However, most Ibos are probably now unreachable by radio (which also poses problems for the FMG in attempting to persuade them that the charges of genocide are false).

If there is guerrilla or irregular warfare (and we believe there will be initially) one clue to how the Ibos are thinking on the genocide issue will be provided by the disposition they make of their women and children--i.e., whether they keep them with them or abandon them to the enemy. Actually, this clue is perhaps already provided, since the retreating Biafran forces have already left large numbers of children, and elderly people outside their lines. (We believe that as many as 2,000,000 may be involved and are attempting to verify this.)

4. Establishment of a Government in Exile. This, of course, would presuppose abandoning the bulk of the Ibos to their fate. It would soon fall through if the abandoned Ibos were well treated.

Comment: Libreville is the locus most often suggested for a Biafran government in exile, although it has been suggested that Fernando Po might somehow enter the picture because of the large number of Ibos there. (There has even been some speculation about an Ibo coup in Fernando Po.) We incline to doubt that Ojukwu would personally head a government in exile except as a last resort (on the theory that once he leaves Biafra he will lose control of the situation).

5. Combinations and permutations of the foregoing cannot be ruled out, such as, for example, ostensible surrender followed by dissimulation, passive resistance, the development of an underground, assassination of "quislings," and so on. A combination of guerrilla or irregular warfare and a government in exile empowered to keep negotiations alive seems possible as well.

Overall Comment: There are still many who maintain that the Ibos are irrevocably persuaded that they will be exterminated if they surrender. It is already implicit in this paper that we do not completely accept this viewpoint.

Our view is inspired partly by fact and partly by reasoning. The fact is that a large number of Ibos are already under FMG control, that the number voluntarily remaining or returning behind FMG lines is slowly increasing, and that they have not suffered the fate that the Biafran radio is still predicting for all Ibos. This fact must be known to many of those in Biafran-controlled territory, and it will become increasingly known as the battle grinds to an end.

The Nigerian Government has in the past displayed little understanding for the concern of the outside world for the plight of the Ibos. It has

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even put a sinister connotation on the word "humanitarianism." However, the FMG is finally beginning to pay some attention to public relations and to the necessity for demonstrating the falsity of the genocide charges. Thus the pressures at which the FMG has bridled have in the long run served a useful purpose.

The reasoning is that as it becomes more and more apparent that they are not being exterminated, the Ibos will use their native intelligence and accommodate themselves to the situation. In short, why should they commit mass suicide if they can live to fight again (whether one takes this to mean to win back their former position in Nigeria or literally to fight again)?

On this basis, then, we do not believe that the Ibos will fight to the last man, although it must be admitted that as of this writing there are few signs of their throwing in the towel.

What seems more likely to happen is a period of guerrilla or irregular warfare followed ultimately by an acceptance of alternative 1: surrender on the terms offered by the FMG.


Before addressing the question of guerrilla warfare by the Biafrans, it would be well at least to consider the possibility of a collapse of Biafran resistance. This could take the form of an admission of failure by Ojukwu, his flight with top advisers, and a new leadership with whom the FMG could negotiate. In these circumstances, there might be a possibility that the Biafrans would agree to an orderly surrender by intact units; that military and administrative organization and discipline could be maintained; and that bloodshed and disorder would be minimized. We do not think this likely, but one factor which might influence events in this direction would be credible evidence of the FMG "magnanimity" which Secretary Rusk and Lord Shepherd have urged upon Arikpo and Gowon respectively.

A second alternative would be a progressive disintegration of the Biafran administrative and military system. This would ultimately result in virtually no effective communication between leadership and individuals; an end of organized resistance by ~~intact~~ units; and a highly increased tendency toward looting, civil disorder, and widespread violence on the part of a demoralized population. In these circumstances the FMG, while "winning" militarily, would undoubtedly have serious problems in organizing an administration and instituting acceptable security measures. Nor would this kind of breakdown necessarily rule out the guerrilla warfare Ojukwu has so long prepared the Ibos for; indeed, it might logically be the theme of his last statement, whether he fled or stayed.

On the question of guerrilla warfare itself, the first consideration is that the Biafrans are capable of it, though the duration and intensity of the effort cannot at the moment be predicted. Given the likelihood that there will be some attempt at guerrilla action--the Ibos have been well

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prepared psychologically for it--we conclude that loosely organized units of Biafran irregulars, supported by friendly terrain and people, could continue to control some of the countryside and effectively harass the FMG. The FMG would almost certainly control the urban areas, the main roads, and the areas where they were present in force during the day; but parts of the country, and the night, would belong to the Biafrans.

POL:EE Ramsaur Jr/FPicard:mjr 10/18/68

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